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ABSTRACT
While writing this Article, I interviewed a journalist who writes stories about harmful
technologies. To do this work, he gathers information from websites to reveal trends that online
platforms would prefer to hide. His team has exposed how Facebook threatens people's privacy
and safety, how Amazon hides cheaper deals from consumers, and how Google diverts political
speech from our inboxes. You'd think the journalist might want credit for telling these important
stories, but he instead insisted on anonymity when we talked because his lawyer was worried he'd
be confessing to breaking the law-to committing the crime and tort of cyber-trespass.
Cyber-trespass law makes it illegal to access websites and gather information without a platform's
permission. Some courts treat all websites as "blackacres"-enclaves of private property that
platforms may govern much like people may exert dominion over their private land in the real
world. This legal regime empowers platforms to selectively and arbitrarily grant and withhold
their consent whenever people attempt to access their websites. Platforms have long exercised
these gatekeeper rights through their computer code, restricting access through authentication
barriers like password gates. But cyber-trespass law has empowered platforms to limit access
through legal code, using their terms of service or cease-and-desist letters to deter people from
gathering information for any reason whatsoever.
This Article argues that this indiscriminate treatment of all websites as blackacres violates the
First Amendment. Applying cyber-trespass rules identically across the internet undermines core
constitutional values by giving platforms unlimited discretion to prevent access to information
that's already within the public sphere. To avoid these unconstitutional applications of cybertrespass law, courts should recognize two types of cyberspaces: Cyber-trespass law should have
no force on websites that are accessible to the general public, but it should offer robust privacy
protections on websites that aren't. Whether a website is publicly accessible for constitutional
purposes should turn on the social structure of communicative practices on particular websites,
not merely whether a website sits behind a password gate. Adopting this framework would not only
satisfy the First Amendment, but also protect privacy interests that are increasingly threatened in
the digital age.
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INTRODUCTION

In the digital age, many of our daily deeds occur on websites created by online
platforms.1 We socialize on Facebook, we network on LinkedIn, we shop on
Amazon. As many social practices have migrated to cyberspace, researchers have
sought to study our interactions on and with these platforms by accessing and
gathering information from their websites. This research allows us to understand
the effects of digital technologies, to oversee the influence that platforms wield, and
to hold accountable the private actors that curate our experiences on the internet.
Consider the work of professors Alan Mislove and Christo Wilson, who
probe jobseeking websites to see whether hiring algorithms discriminate against
applicants based on race or gender.? Or the experiment by three Harvard Business
School academics, who examined Airbnb activity to find that guests with
distinctively African American names were 16 percent less likely to be accepted
relative to identical guests with distinctively white names.3 Or the study by Abby
Whitmarsh, who exposed the gendered dynamics of online abuse by finding that

1

2.

3.

See Przemyslaw Jacek Palka, Terms of Service Are Not Contracts-BeyondContractLaw in the
Regulation of Online Platforms, in 3 EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 135, 139
(Stefan Grundmann ed., 2018) (exploring the "terminological confusion" that can arise when
discussing "platforms" and noting that the likes of Google, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter
"perform functions of high importance for the digital society we currently live in"). I adopt
Tarleton Gillespie's definition of platforms as online sites and services that "host, organize, and
circulate users' shared content or social interactions for them," without having produced the
bulk of that content themselves, built on an infrastructure that processes data for "customer
service, advertising, and profit."
TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET:
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 18
(2018). The constitutional analysis proposed in this Article would apply to all websites, not
merely websites created by platforms, but I often focus on platforms because they've been
"particularly aggressive in enforcing their rights as digital gatekeepers under cyber-trespass law."
Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEXAS L. REv. 951, 953 n.3 (2021). Prominent
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon also have significant political and commercial
influence and thus seem particularly worthy of attention for their role in exercising their legal
rights under cyber-trespass law. See Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in
2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7,2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/04/07/socialmedia-use-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/R589-9Y35] (revealing that a comfortable majority of
Americans report using Facebook and YouTube, while 59 percent of both Snapchat and
Instagram users admit accessing those platforms on a daily basis).
See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018); Christo Wilson & Alan Mislove, We're
Suing the FederalGovernment to Be Free to Do Our Research, CONVERSATION (Mar. 27, 2017,
10:40 PM), https://theconversation.com/were-suing-the-federal-government-to-be-free-todo-our-research-74676 [https://perma.cc/L6HS-3KL5].
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirksy, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence From a FieldExperiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. 1, 1, 7 (2017).
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378 out of 396 posts on a nonconsensual-pornography website depicted women.4
Or the research of Jonathan Albright, who studied Facebook data to reveal that the
2016 Russian disinformation campaign was worse than the platform had
admitted.' All four of these projects-and many alike in recent years-rely on the
mass collection and analysis of information published on websites. 6
Because these particular websites were accessible to the general public, we
might expect that the researchers were free to collect the information, analyze it,
and then expose these salient political, social, and economic matters. But the rise
of digital research has clashed with steps taken by platforms to prevent people from
gathering information online. All the major platforms have policies against
scraping-the automated collection of information from websites-while many
platforms have rules against accessing their websites for research purposes or
using information gleaned from their websites in ways that might harm their
interests.'
Were these prohibitions backed solely by technological restrictions or private
contractual rights, that would be one thing. But platforms have a more potent tool
at their disposal: cyber-trespass law, which makes it illegal to gather information
from websites without the platforms' permission.' Some courts have treated

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

Abby Whitmarsh, Analysis of28 Days of DataScrapedFroma Revenge PornographyWebsite,
ABBY
WHITMARSH
(Apr.
13,
2015),
https://everlastingstudent.wordpress.com
/2015/04/13/analysis-of-28-days-of-data-scraped-from-a-revenge-pornography-website
[https://perma.cc/779D-XFZE].
Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Takes Down Data and Thousands of Posts,
Obscuring Reach of Russian Disinformation, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017, 8:42 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/12/facebook-takes-downdata-and-thousands-of-posts-obscuring-reach-of-russiandisinformation/?utmterm=.5b680604ed3d [https://perma.cc/WCM5-KBRY].
See generally Kadri, supra note 1, at 977-82.
See, e.g., Automated Data Collection Terms, FACEBOOK (Apr. 15, 2010), https://
www.facebook.com/apps/sitescraping_tos_terms.php
[https://perma.cc/Y7WSHJF6] ("You will not engage in Automated Data Collection without Facebook's express
written permission.") (last visited Oct. 24, 2021); Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/en/tos [https://perma.cc/5T9U-EAP2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021)
("[S]craping the Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly
prohibited...."); API Terms of Use, LINKEDIN (Mar. 25, 2019), https://
legal.linkedin.com/api-terms-of-use
[https://perma.cc/54VF-KGXM] (noting that
"[y]ou must not: ... Scrape Content from the Services" or "[a]ccess, store, display, or
facilitate the transfer of any LinkedIn content obtained through the following methods:
scraping, crawling, spidering or using any other technology or software to access
LinkedIn content outside the APIs"); see also Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1 (assessing cybertrespass liability of researchers who wish to scrape websites).
This Article's main focus is on Section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA). See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2018). Some cyber-trespass laws, including the
CFAA, prohibit other computer-related harms, such as when unauthorized computer access
leads to fraud and damage. See id. § 1030(a)(4), (5). Although these prohibitions can still be
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websites as enclaves of private property that platforms may govern much like
owners of private land may use trespass law to exclude people from their property
in the real world.9 Under this legal regime, platforms can selectively and arbitrarily
grant and withhold their consent whenever someone wishes to access their
websites. They enjoy these legal rights as digital gatekeepers, thanks not only to
computer code but also legal code. 10 By invoking their terms of service or sending
cease-and-desist letters, they've used cyber-trespass law to deter people from
accessing their websites and gathering information for any reason whatsoever.
Time after time, platforms have used cyber-trespass law to threaten people
with criminal and tort liability for gathering information without the platforms'
prior consent." Of particular concern, platforms have blocked or chilled
academics, journalists, and competitors from accessing the information they need
to comprehend digital life. 12 On the cusp ofthe 2020 U.S. presidential election, for
example, Facebook threatened New York University researchers with an
"enforcement action" if they didn't immediately end their study and delete any
data that might inform the public about targeted political advertising.13 Even if

9.

10.
11.
12.

13.

thought of as part of cyber-trespass law-because they still build from the concept of
unauthorized access to a computer-I do not address them here because the economic harms
that they cover are materially different from the information-related harms targeted by Section
1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA and analogous state-law provisions. See Orin S. Kerr, Trespass, Not
Fraud: The Needfor New Sentencing Guidelines in CFAA Cases, 84 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1544,
1545-46 (2016) [hereinafter Kerr, Trespass];Jonathan Mayer, CybercrimeLitigation, 164 U. PA.
L. REv. 1453, 1482, 1484, 1487, 1493 (2016) (showing that the conduct alleged in both civil and
criminal CFAA cases predominantly involved "misappropriating information" and other
information-related harms). The term cyber-trespass has also been used to refer to applying
common law torts like trespass to chattels in the cyber realm. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 73 (2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
Although some of this Article's analysis applies with equal force in this context, I focus here on
statutes designed to regulate access to information on computers.
See Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A TrespassFrameworkfor the Crime of Hacking, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1477, 1477-79 (2016) (arguing that the idea of "authorization" under cybertrespass law "has the same meaning as authorization under criminal physical trespass laws").
See Kadri, supranote 1.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (e)(10); infra Subpart II.A.
See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016); hiQ
Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Pete Warden, How
to Split Up the US, PETE WARDEN'S BLOG (Feb. 6, 2010), https://
petewarden.com/2010/02/06/how-to-split-up-the-us [https://perma.cc/D648-FHVN]
(presenting research about social networks based on data gathered from 210 million
public Facebook profiles using crawling techniques); Pete Warden, How I Got Sued by
Facebook,
PETE
WARDEN'S
BLOG
(Apr.
5,
2010),
https://
petewarden.com/2010/04/05/how-i-got-sued-by-facebook
[https://perma.cc/8SNJ-S866]
(telling the story of Facebook's threat to sue him for failing to "obtain prior written permission"
to conduct his research and Facebook's demand that he delete the data set).
Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Seeks Shutdown of NYU Research ProjectInto PoliticalAd Targeting,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2020, 8:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-
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platforms ultimately refrain from suing researchers, they rely on the threat of legal
action to thwart investigations that go against their interests.14
This legal landscape has also encouraged platforms to develop radically
different approaches to managing their relationships with outside researchers.
Despite the platforms' policies against scraping, many have selectively waived
certain restrictions when it suits them. Facebook cherrypicks particular
researchers by entering into data-sharing partnerships that permit a handful of
lucky outsiders to study information on its website." Twitter, meanwhile, sells
access to anyone willing to pay, offering troves of information to those able to
cough up the hefty sums of money Twitter demands for permitting such access. 16
And LinkedIn erects technological barriers to prevent researchers from
developing competing services that rely on publicly accessible information about
LinkedIn's users." Despite these differences, however, the principle behind the
platforms' approaches is the same: My House, My Rules. The law gives platforms a
gatekeeper right to grant or deny permission as they see fit, just as homeowners
may exclude people from their property for any reason at all. Put simply, websites
are "blackacres." 18

14.
15.

16.

17.
18.

seeks-shutdown-of-nyu-research-project-into-political-ad-targeting- 11603488533
[https://perma.cc/HHJ7-557B] (reporting that Facebook "has sent legal demands and
sometimes filed suits against entities it accuses of seeking data access for nefarious purposes").
See, e.g., Interview with Anonymous Journalist (Mar. 15, 2019); infra Subpart II.B.
Columbia Journalism School, DataJournalismand the Law, YOUTUBE, at 1:12:10 (Jan. 29,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWKgh70DYec&feature=youtu.be
[https://perma.cc/BFW2-XZTE] (Alex Abdo noting that Facebook wants researchers to go
through "approved channels of access" before doing any research); Gary King & Nathaniel
Persily, A New Model for Industry-Academic Partnerships,53 PS 703 (2020) (proposing a
"model for industry-academic partnerships" that the authors adopted to partner with
Facebook in order to access the platform's data); Yeshi, An Open Letter to Facebook From
the
Data for
Black
Lives
Movement,
MEDIUM
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://medium.com/@YESHICAN/an-open-letter-to-facebook-from-the-data-forblack-lives-movement-81e693c6b46c [https://perma.cc/HN5T-VAEA] (proposing the
"Data for Black Lives" and "Public Data Trust" initiatives to encourage Facebook to permit
research from diverse researchers).
Twitter
API,
TWITTER,
https://developer.twitter.com/en/products/twitter-api
[https://perma.cc/8H29-9H6Z] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021); Configure Search Tweets:
30-Days,
TWITTER,
https://developer.twitter.com/en/pricing/search-30day
[https://perma.cc/C5F8-UUXH] (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (outlining Twitter's
"Premium" package that provides access to 5 million tweets for $2499 per month) (click
"Select" under the "Premium" column).
See hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1103-04, 1120.
I use the term blackacres to capture the idea of websites being discrete pieces of real property.
As any American law student will know, property professors often pose hypotheticals about a
fictitious plot of land called Blackacre. Although the word's etymology is shrouded in mystery,
we know that treatises have referred to imaginary lands as "Blackacres" and "Whiteacres" for
centuries. See EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITVTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
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This Article argues that it's unconstitutional for the law to treat all websites as
blackacres. 19 Applying cyber-trespass rules uniformly across the entire internet
offends core First Amendment values by giving platforms limitless discretion to
restrict the flow of information that has already entered the public sphere. To
reconcile cyber-trespass law with the First Amendment, this Article provides a
frameworkthat avoids unconstitutional applications ofcyber-trespass law. Courts
should recognize two types of cyberspaces. Cyber-trespass law should have no
force on websites that are accessible to the general public, but it should offer robust
privacy protections on websites that aren't. Whether a website is publicly
accessible for constitutional purposes should turn on the social structure of
communicative practices on particular websites. This structure is shaped by
contextual factors, including the website's technical architecture and the
interpersonal dynamics between online speakers and audiences on the website,
not merely whether the website sits behind a password gate.20 Adopting this
conceptual framework would protect not only speech interests that should be
guaranteed by the First Amendment, but also privacy interests that are
increasingly threatened in the digital age.

148 (1628); FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT Nis1PRIUS

74 (1790). Contemporary scholars have suggested that the terms may reference colors
associated with different crops ("peas and beans are black, corn and potatoes are white, hay is
green") or the means of paying rents ("black rents are payable in produce, white rents in
silver"). See JESSE DUKEMINIER

1 9.

& JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY

142 n.25 (6th ed. 2006).

My argument against treating websites as blackacres extends only to cyber-trespass laws that
regulate access to information on publicly accessible websites. The blackacre analogy-and the
right to exclude that it implies-might be quite apt when the law prohibits, say, distributed
denial-of-service attacks, which can "censor or dissuade speakers" by flooding a website with
traffic and causing it to crash. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big
Data,Private Governance, andNew School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1190
(2018); see also NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL

20.

LIVES 4 (2019) (explaining that this type of cyberattack "works by flooding a web server with so
many fake requests that it becomes unable to respond-effectively shutting the website
down").
See infra Subpart III.B. Peter Winn makes a conceptually similar argument on statutory, not
constitutional, grounds. See Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: UnauthorizedAccess, Trespassand
Privacy, 62 Bus. LAW. 1395, 1399 (2007). In his view, courts should draw on the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to limit the reach of cyber-trespass law,
declaring access to be unauthorized (and therefore illegal) only when it violates an "objective
norm" that "reflect[s] the customs, practices and values of a society." Id. Winn's statutory
proposal, though largely complementary to mine, would offer little help to courts in
jurisdictions where such a nuanced approach to cyber-trespass liability has already been
rejected, whereas my constitutional argument would still be viable.
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The key constitutional fault with current cyber-trespass law is the absolute
discretion it gives platforms to set the internet's information-access rules." By its
own terms, cyber-trespass law potentially applies whenever any person accesses
any information on any website by any means.22 The sole inherent constraint
within this legal framework is that a person is liable for cyber-trespass only if they
lack the platform's consent to view the information.23 Courts have grappled with
the implications of this consent-based rule for years, issuing conflicting guidance
about how platforms can provide legally adequate notice that consent is lacking.24
For their part, platforms and prosecutors have used various theories of actual,
constructive, and implicit notice to bring claims and charges against those who
seek to gather information from websites-even websites that are otherwise
accessible to the general public.25 In response, a handful of scholars and courts
have proposed limiting the reach of cyber-trespass law by noting that legislators
probably never intended the law to apply to public portions of websites.2 6 Yet
despite the many criticisms leveled against cyber-trespass law, few have addressed
how the First Amendment might curtail its application.2 7 Recent litigation has

21.

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.

27.

See Daniel J. Solove &Neil M. Richards, RethinkingFree Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1650, 1668 (2009) ("[I]t is important to note that sometimes the state can censor just as
effectively through legal forms that are private as it can through ones that are public.").
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I and Subpart II.A. In an insightful new article, Laurent Sacharoff suggests
another possible constraint that courts could recognize, though he acknowledges that none
have done so to date: the requirement that a defendant knowingly access the information
without authorization. See Laurent Sacharoff, Criminal Trespass and Computer Crime, 62
WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 587-610 (2020). Sacharoff presents persuasive evidence that courts
have ignored this mens rea limitation, instead focusing on what it means to access a computer
"without authorization" as a way of limiting the law's reach. Id.; see also William A. Hall, Jr.,
The Ninth Circuit's Deficient Examination ofthe Legislative History of the Computer Fraudand
Abuse Act in United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1523,1528-31 (2016) (emphasizing
how one court overlooked the mental state necessary for cyber-trespass liability); David Thaw,
Criminalizing Hacking, NotDating: Reconstructing the CFAA IntentRequirement,103 J. CRM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 945-47 (2013) (proposing a legislative revision to the mental state for
cyber-trespass liability).
See infra Subpart II.A.
See infra Subpart II.A.
See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1108-14 (N.D. Cal. 2017);
Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 326-31
(2004).
Fifteen years ago, Christine Galbraith addressed the question of how cyber-trespass law should
apply to publicly accessible websites. See Galbraith, supra note 26. Galbraith predominantly
focused on how recognizing cyber-trespass rights on publicly accessible websites could disrupt
the careful balance struck by copyright law and threaten the free flow of information that
belongs in the public domain. See id. at 324. Her fears about the law's application to these
websites were prescient, and her arguments remain powerful today. I seek to build on them in
light of later doctrinal developments and the evolving role that platforms currently play in our
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brought this question to the fore, leading platforms and researchers to make their
competing cases to the courts.28 In a further twist, the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision last term in Van Buren v. United States 29 brings new urgency (and
uncertainty) to old debates about the scope of cyber-trespass law.30 Although the
Court offered some long-awaited guidance, it left lower courts to resolve a host of
important issues-including the constitutional matters at the heart of this Article.
Constitutional doctrine from both before and after the internet's creation
provides insights into how courts should square cyber-trespass law with the First
Amendment. This Article, by building on that doctrine and applying it in this new
setting, not only develops a framework to challenge cyber-trespass law's
application to publicly accessible websites, but also mounts a constitutional
defense ofits application to websites that are inaccessible to the general public.31 In
short, the First Amendment should restrict the government's ability to proscribe
the use of information that has already entered the public sphere, as is the case
when platforms publish information on websites that are open to the general
public. The government may constitutionally regulate the collection and use of
information in certain circumstances, such as when it narrowly restricts harmful
practices that rely on publicly accessible information. But those laws must be
tailored to advance compelling interests-a hurdle that cyber-trespass law fails to
clear when it's universally applied to publicly accessible websites. At the same time,
the First Amendment poses no bar-and in fact supports-the government's
recognition of trespass-based rights to protect secluded cyberspaces. Just as
traditional trespass law protects private physical spaces from eavesdropping and
newsgathering, so too may cyber-trespass law constitutionally empower platforms
to prohibit information-gathering on websites that are inaccessible to the general

public.
In practical terms, this means that applying cyber-trespass law is
constitutionally suspect when it creates liability for gathering information
from publicly accessible websites, but not when it's used to punish intrusions
into cyberspaces that are inaccessible to the general public.
The

28.
29.
30.
31.

society. More recently, law student Jacquellena Carrero has proposed statutory changes that
would protect First Amendment interests currently threatened by cyber-trespass law.
Jacquellena Carrero, Note, Access Granted: A First Amendment Theory ofReform of the CFAA
Access Provision, 120 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (2020) (arguing that Congress should amend the
CFAA in order to protect various competing First Amendment interests).
See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019); Sandvig v. Sessions, 315
F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018).
141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
See infra Subpart II.B.
See infra Subpart III.B.
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constitutionality of cyber-trespass law, then, should turn on the social
structure of communicative practices on particular websites instead of
applying indiscriminately to the entire internet. Under current doctrine, all
information on all websites gets similar treatment: it's subject to gatekeeper
rights that undermine the internet's diversity and empower private platforms
with an unconstitutional say-so over how information flows. But information
gathered from websites shouldn't be treated in this decontextualized fashion
merely because it's digitized. Rather, courts should limit cyber-trespass law's
reach through a constitutional analysis that considers how, where, why, and
with whom we share information on the internet.
Reframing cyber-trespass doctrine in this way will help to curb a power
imbalance that currently exists between platforms and the public. "With the
explosion of technology," Sonja West has remarked, "we all now have at our
fingertips the power to convey information broadly."" But this newfound power
to publish information lacks a parallel power to gather that same information.
Instead, under cyber-trespass law, the platforms that enable us to share
information with the general public have blocked us from analyzing that
information on a larger scale. This Article seeks to address this disparity through
a new doctrinal framework-one that serves both speech and privacy interests in
the digital age.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explores the infrastructure of
cyber-trespass law, explaining how statutory and doctrinal shifts have transformed
a once-narrow law into one that potentially covers any person who accesses any
website and views any information. Part II delves into the crucial issue of consent,
which now effectively serves as the on-off switch for cyber-trespass liability. It then
draws on interviews with platform employees and digital researchers to provide
new insights into how cyber-trespass law has affected platforms' power to constrain
researchers and researchers' ability to study platforms. Finally, Part III analyzes the
constitutional implications of cyber-trespass law, developing a mutually
reinforcing challenge to and defense of its application in different types of
cyberspaces.

32.

Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2462 (2014). West's argument for
treating the press differently in certain circumstances could provide an interesting model for
potential privacy laws that would treat digital researchers differently than data aggregators. She
argues that the First Amendment supports a "functional" approach to defining the press based
on the unique role that press speakers play in our society. Id. at 2454-62; see also Sonja R. West,
The "Press,"Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016) (exploring the societal role that the press
has historically played). Similar analytical moves might help us unpack how tailored privacy
laws could distinguish between researchers and other actors who gather information from
websites.
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I.

THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF CYBER-TRESPASS LAW

In John Perry Barlow's revered-yet-rebuked Declarationof the Independence
of Cyberspace in 1996, he asserted that cyberspace was "a world that is both
everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live."" He described a "global
social space" where legal concepts of property "do not apply," since these concepts
"are all based on matter, and there is no matter here."" Not only did Barlow's
utopian rhetoric disregard the darker realities of cyberspace,35 it also overlooked a
federal law that had already been on the books for a decade: the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA). 36
Despite Barlow's wishful declaration that cyberspace had severed ties with
property law, the CFAA drew from the example of trespass in prohibiting
unauthorized access to computer networks. The statute imposes criminal and tort
liability on anyone who "accesses a computer without authorization" and
"obtains ... information."" Similar cyber-trespass laws now exist in all fifty states
and over forty foreign countries.3 8 California, for example, makes criminals out of
anyone who "accesses and without permission takes, copies, or makes use of any
data" from a computer network.39 Through these laws, legislators have expressed
their desire to punish people for committing the technological equivalent of
"breaking and entering" into a home.40 You might use a keyboard instead of a
crowbar, but the law penalizes you all the same.
A vision of the archetypal hacker might already be in your mind, but it was a
quite different character who first inspired President Ronald Reagan to call for
cyber-trespass to be a federal offense. True to his Hollywood roots, he was stirred

33.

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, EFF (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.cc/R4F3-67GA].

34.
35.

Id.

36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

See Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER &L. 224,224-30 (2011).
18 U.S.C. § 1030.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C); see also Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 239-40
(2016).
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access" and 'Authorization" in Computer
Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1596, 1597 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope];
Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1017 (2001). See
generallyMary W. S. Wong, Cyber-trespassand 'UnauthorizedAccess'asLegal Mechanisms of
Access Control: Lessons From the US Experience, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 90, 115-24 (2007)
(discussing connections between cyber-trespass law in the United States and other common
law countries).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(2) (West 2020).
H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 20 (1984).
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to act after watching a movie-the 1983 drama WarGames.41 The film tells the
story of a young computer whiz who nearly triggers nuclear war after accidentally
accessing the Pentagon's network and mistaking it for a computer game.4 2 Soon
after watching the movie at Camp David, President Reagan interrupted a meeting
with his joint chiefs to quiz them on the plot's plausibility, and his advisors
encouraged immediate action to protect computer networks against hacking.43
Congress then passed its first cyber-trespass law as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, swiftly followed by the CFAA in 1986 to "deter[] the
criminal element from abusing computer technology.""
When Congress passed the CFAA, cyberspace was a quite different place
than it is now. There were only 2000 computers connected to the network, and
websites didn't even exist.45 Over the years, various amendments broadened the
statute's scope. Whereas in 1986 the CFAA covered only financial records
obtained from a limited set of computer networks, it now covers "any
unauthorized access to any protected computer that retrieves any information of
any kind."46 And the idea of "obtaining information" under the CFAA includes
simply viewing it on a computer screen, lest anyone assume that the verb "obtain"
limits the law's reach.47 We have thus seen a "radical transformation" of cybertrespass law over the last thirty years, 48 such that it now plausibly applies to all
information on all computer networks-including all websites-anywhere in the

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

47.

48.

Gabe Rottman, Knight Institute's Facebook 'Safe Harbor' Proposal Showcases Need for
Comprehensive CFAA Reform, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PREss (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.rcfp.org/knight-institutes-facebook-safe-harbor-proposal-showcases-needcompr [https://perma.cc/43KU-Y3JD].
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 4 (1984).
See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962,970 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that the
CFAA was passed "well before the development of the modern internet"); Orin S. Kerr, Norms
of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 1143, 1161 (2016) [hereinafter Kerr, Norms];
Corynne McSherry, Want More Competition in Tech? Get Rid of Outdated Computer,
Copyright, and Contract Rules, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/want-more-competition-tech-get-rid-outdatedcomputer-copyright-and-contract-rules [https://perma.cc/KBR7-CJHG].
See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challengesto the ComputerFraudandAbuseAct, 94 MINN. L. REv.
1561, 1564-71 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Vagueness] (discussing various CFAA amendments
from 1986 to 2008).
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2484 (noting
that the statute's "obtaining information" language includes the "mere observation of the
data"); Healthcare Advocs., Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627,648
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that "[v]iewing material on a computer screen constitutes
'obtaining' information under the CFAA").
Mayer, supra note 8, at 1456.
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world. 49 As one federal judge once remarked, the statute now applies to "nearly
all desktops, laptops, servers, smart-phones, as well as any 'iPad, Kindle, Nook, Xbox, Blu-Ray player or any other Internet-enabled device,' including even some
thermostats," and thus the law "covers untold millions of Americans' interactions
with these objects every day."5 This has generated particular concern because, as
we'll soon see, courts have held that violating a website's written policies can
support cyber-trespass liability.51 We've thus moved from a law targeting
harmful behavior by the stereotypical computer hacker to one that might cover
mundane activity by your next-door neighbor. Or, as Andrea M. Matwyshyn
colorfully notes, cyber-trespass law may now turn everyone from your
grandmother to Chief Justice Roberts into a felonious cybercriminal."
The sweeping reach of contemporary cyber-trespass law has generated fierce
criticism.53 Tim Wu dubs the CFAA "the worst law in technology" and "the most
outrageous criminal law you've never heard of," arguing that its "egregiously
overbroad" provisions are "a nightmare for a country that calls itself free."" Orin
Kerr, meanwhile, fears that the CFAA's "breathtakingly broad"" scope has made
it "the law that threatens to swallow the internet."5 6 Not only does the prospect of
widespread criminal liability cause anxiety, but the law's corresponding civil
liability also allows anyone suffering damage or loss due to a cyber-trespass

49.

50.
51
52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

Kerr, Vagueness,supra note 46, at 1568, 1571,1577 (noting that the CFAA appears to cover "every
computer connected to the Internet" and that "it may be no exaggeration to say that a 'protected
computer' now just means a 'computer'" located "anywhere in the world").
United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2016) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
See infra Subpart II.A.2.
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 165-68 (2013);
see also Mike Masnick, Supreme Court ChiefJustice Admits He Doesn't Read Online EULAs
or
Other
'Fine Print', TECHDIRT
(Oct.
22,
2010,
9:48
AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101021/02145811519/supreme-court-chief-justiceadmits-he-doesn-t-read-online-eulas-or-other-fine-print. shtml [https://perma.cc/SST363TD].
See Kerr, Trespass, supra note 8, at 1545 (arguing that the CFAA "is controversial in part
because its punishments are widely perceived as draconian"). Violations can be felonies or
misdemeanors, with sentences going as high as twenty years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c). Despite
the sizeable punishments already provided by the statute, there have been attempts in Congress
to double the potential sentences. See Data Breach Notification and Punishing Cyber
Criminals Act, S. 1027, 114th Cong. (2015).
Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-technology
[https://perma.cc/74PJ-Y6CU].
Kerr, Vagueness, supranote 46, at 1563; see also id. at 1561 (arguing that the CFAA "potentially
regulates every use of every computer in the United States and even many millions of
computers abroad," making it "one of the most far-reaching criminal laws in the United States
Code").
Orin S. Kerr, CriminalLaw in Virtual Worlds, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 415,423 (2008).
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violation to seek compensatory and injunctive relief." Even ifprosecutors exercise
discretion by not bringing criminal charges, the specter of tort claims looms large.
The source of most cyber-trespass strife is baked into the statutes themselves.
The CFAA's "original sin," as one commentator puts it, was failing to define what
it means to access a computer network "without authorization." 8 In an early
blockbuster cyber-trespass case, one court declared that "authorization" is a word
"of common usage, without any technical or ambiguous meaning," 59 but other
courts and scholars have suggested a wide range of interpretations.60 The debates
surrounding this issue have led Jennifer Granick to lament that "authorization"
under cyber-trespass law is in the "eye of the beholder."6 1
We can read Granick's remark in two ways, both of which tell us something
important about cyber-trespass law. In one sense, it can be a critique of the lack of
clarity in this area: Everyone-from judges to prosecutors to technologists-has a
different opinion about what authorization means, creating confusion about the
term's legal significance and scope. This seems to be Granick's primary concern
when she bemoans that rival theories tie the question of authorization
unpredictably to "terms of service, clickthrough notices, (sometimes competing)
cultural expectations, technological protection measures, employment contracts,
or cease and desist letters." 2 The problem, then, is that there are multiple-and
perhaps contradictory-indicators of when accessing a website is without
authorization and therefore illegal. This definitional hodgepodge means that
judges are likely to make inconsistent rulings; prosecutors are emboldened to seek
expansive indictments to gain leverage for plea deals; and private actors are
empowered to threaten lawsuits spurred by ambitious liability theories. 63 Legal

62.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
Rottman, supra note 41.
United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504,511 (2nd Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Winn, supra note 20, at 1399 (proposing a two-part inquiry based on the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test used in Fourth Amendment caselaw).
Jennifer Granick, Towards LearningFrom Losing Aaron Swartz, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y
(Jan. 14, 2013, 4:37 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/01/towards-learninglosing-aaron-swartz [https://perma.cc/JA29-UM7X] (worrying that the mercurial concept of
authorizationis "thedistinguishing line between legal and prison").
Id.

63.

See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 188 (2014) (arguing that

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

prosecutors' "strained interpretation of vague language" in the CFAA made it easy to indict
one particular defendant even though none of the alleged crimes "captured her behavior"
and her conduct had "very little to do with computer hacking that the law covered"). As
Citron argued, the vagaries of cyber-trespass law can allow prosecutors to react to "the
public's outcry" by bringing criminal charges whenever somebody behaves badly while
using a computer, even if the bad behavior bears no resemblance to hacking. Id.
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uncertainty always has costs, but we might worry that the costs here are
particularly high.
Granick's remark has a second insightful meaning: that authorization is in
the "eye of the beholder" because each website owner has the power to decide
whether access is authorized. This could be seen as a bug of cyber-trespass lawGranick, for one, worries that the law gives people too much power to "unilaterally
decide what is right and wrong on their system" and then use "the full force of
federal law" to enforce their wishes. 64 But it could also be afeature. Just as trespass
liability in the real world turns on whether property owners consent to your
presence on their land, so too does cyber-trespass liability turn on whether
website owners allow you to access their websites.65 As James Grimmelmann
has explained, the term "without authorization" in cyber-trespass law doesn't
refer to "what a computer user does" but rather "what a computer owner says about
those uses."66 By design, then, cyber-trespass law "does not of its own force define
a class of prohibited conduct, because literally any conduct in relation to a
computer could be either authorized or unauthorized."67 Indeed, as I've noted
elsewhere, changing a headline on a newspaper's website can be "an unauthorized
act of cyber-vandalism when done by a prankster" but "an authorized act of cybermaintenance when undone by the newspaper's editors."68
Recast in this way, it no longer seems as problematic that cyber-trespass
statutes fail to define specific types of prohibited conduct, since liability turns on
what website owners choose to allow. 69 As Grimmelmann notes: "Questions ofthe
form, 'Does the CFAA prohibit or allow X?' are posed at the wrong level of
abstraction. The issue is not whether Xis allowed, but whether X is allowed by the
computer's owner."7 In other words, "[e]verything turns on the 'moral magic' of
consent""-and that's a good thing. This reliance on consent might result in "a
messy, fact-laden inquiry" that clashes with the goal of having easy-to-understand

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71

Granick, supra note 61; see also Kadri, supra note 1, at 960 (discussing how the CFAA's
"authorization" trigger could be seen as a "feature" or "bug").
See James Grimmelmann, Consentingto Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1500, 1502
(2016).
Id. at 1501.
Id.
Kadri, supra note 1, at 961; see generally Joseph Serna & Stephen Ceasar, FormerReuters Social
Media Editor Convicted of Aiding L.A. Times Hack, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:54 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-matthew-keys-convicted-hacking-la-times20151007-story.html [https://perma.cc/4XV8-J2RV] (discussing the real case that inspired
this not-so-hypothetical hypothetical); see also Grimmelmann, supranote 65, at 1501 (same).
See Grimmelmann, supra note 65, at 1501.
Id.
Id. at 1502 (quoting Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996);
Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1996)).
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laws that clearly define proscribed conduct.72 But that's the price we must pay to
give legal force to someone's consent, as we do not only with real-world trespass,
but also with other torts and crimes like battery and sexual assault.73 Seen from this
perspective, some of the uncertainty swirling around cyber-trespass law is both
intrinsic and valuable.74
Contemporary cyber-trespass law, then, has a sweeping reach. What began
as a narrow statute aimed at preventing hackers from "breaking and entering" into
a limited set of computer networks to obtain sensitive types of information has
now morphed into an all-encompassing legal regime that plausibly covers even
routine conduct involving computers. By the law's own terms, it potentially
applies whenever any person views any information on any website by any means.
The sole inherent constraint within this statutory framework is the requirement
that a person is liable for cyber-trespass only when they lack the website owner's
consent to access the information. The following Part delves into how courts have
converted concepts from traditional trespass law when judging whether consent is
lacking under cyber-trespass law.
II.

BLACKACRES IN CYBERSPACE

Having introduced the idea that consent is a fundamental feature of cybertrespass law, let's now unpack how courts have understood it and enforced it in this
area. To interpret the concept of "authorization" in this legal regime, courts have
channeled real-world trespass law in sculpting what constitutes legally adequate
notice that consent is lacking. This Part begins by exploring how consent operates
in real-world trespass law before surveying its translation into cyber-trespass law.
A.

The Blackacre Principle, from Blackstone to Zuckerberg

The maxim that a "man's home is his castle" has ancient roots in property
law. William Blackstone remarked that the law has "so particular and tender a
75

73.
74.

75.

James Grimmelmann, Computer Crime Law Goes to the Casino, TAP (May 24, 2013),
https://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/May-2013/Computer-Crime-Law-Goes-to-theCasino.aspx [https://perma.cc/8F65-YJG3].
See Grimmelmann, supra note 65, at 1502.
See Grimmelmann, supra note 72 ("The problem with the CFAA is not some recent mutation
of a law that has outgrown its original purpose. The problem was there all along; it was inherent
in the very project of the CFAA.").
See, e.g., Jonathan L. Hafetz, "A Man's Home is His Castle?": Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and PrivacyDuring the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM.
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175 (2002) (observing that "[t]he maxim that a 'man's house is
his castle' is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted principles in Anglo-American
&

72.
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regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it his castle, and will never
suffer it to be violated with impunity."76 Over time, this maxim has animated laws
criminalizing trespass, the right of self-defense to repel intruders," the ability to
seek civil damages for trespass under tort law,78 and legal penalties for
eavesdropping that punished intrusions into home life even when no physical
trespass occurred. 79
The maxim captures not only the perceived sanctity of private property, but
also the idea that property owners enjoy the right to exclude others from their
land.80 This right, said to be one of the most valuable sticks in any bundle of
property rights,81 is better thought of as the "gatekeeper right" because it's as much
about inclusion as it is about exclusion.8 2 As Thomas Merrill notes when referring

jurisprudence"); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (discussing the maxim's
influence on the U.S. Supreme Court); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (invoking the maxim when interpreting the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in "their ... houses").
76.

77.

78.
79.
80.

81

82.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223 (Callaghan & Co. 3d.

rev. ed. 1884) (1769).
See Hafetz, supra note 75, at 180-201; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,643-44 (1999); BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 180 ("If any
person... attempts to break open a house in the night-time... and shall be killed in such
attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged."); Semayne's Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep.
194, 195 (KB); 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b (explaining that committing homicide in self-defense was
a felony but killing in defense of one's home was not).
See Davies, supra note 77, at 625; Page Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59
COLUM. L. REv. 457,464-65 (1959).
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 168.
See Davies, supra note 77, at 642 ("The domicile was a sacrosanct interest in late eighteenthcentury common law, as evidenced by the doctrine that 'a man's house is his castle."'); Hafetz,
supra note 75, at 180 ("The home's privileged legal status traditionally derived from the sanctity
of private property.").
See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 145, at
194 (1888); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1835 (2006); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (holding
that the right to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property"); Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,250
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("An essential element of individual property is the legal right
to exclude others from enjoying it."). Going one step further, Thomas Merrill claims that "the
right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of
property." Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 731
(1998). In Merrill's view, the other rights we typically associate with property are merely
derivations of a property owner's gatekeeper right to include or exclude others from their
property. The right to use land, for example, is but "a very small step" from the gatekeeper right
because it "allows A to determine who may remain on Blackacre and what activities they may
engage in there." Id. at 741 (emphasis added); see also id. at 744 ("At its core, the gatekeeper
right is the right to determine the use of resources, by exercising the power of exclusion and
inclusion.").
Merrill, supranote 81, at 744. Merrill's conception of the right to exclude as a gatekeeper right
finds support in sources both ancient and modern. It underlies Blackstone's famed description
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to the famous and fictitious plot of land, to say that "A has the right to exclude
others from Blackacre" really means that "A has the power to act as the gatekeeper
of Blackacre," because A can either "forbid other persons from entering onto
Blackacre" or "consent to other persons entering" onto Blackacre.83 As Blackacre's
gatekeeper, A enjoys "the power to determine who has access to Blackacre and on
what terms."84 The idea of the gatekeeper right lies at the heart of the "libertarian
value" of property because, as Carol Rose notes, it gives owners powerful
"decisionmaking authority" that doesn't "necessarily mean that property owners
do exclude others; it would mean only that they can decide whether to exclude or
not."85 What's important, then, is that the property owner enjoys "a small domain
of complete mastery, complete self-direction, and complete protection from the
whims of others." 6 The reason why the owner gives or denies consent is
immaterial; all that matters is that they've exercised their exclusive prerogative.
The gatekeeper right protected by trespass law has deep ties to legal interests
in seclusion. Trespass law has been called one of the "[b] asic kernels of privacy"
that was "infused in early American common law."87 The libertarian value of
property does more than protect against government intrusions, for property
rights protect "a sphere of personal and private freedom," in which people have
"the right to be 'let alone' to enjoy 'personal security, personal liberty and private
property."'88 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "[o]ne of the main rights
attaching to property is the right to exclude others ... and one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate

83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.

of property rights as protecting "sole and despotic dominion" overland, capturing the sense of
complete sovereignty and control that owners may exercise. BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at 2;
see also Merrill, supra note 81, at 753 (noting that Blackstone's language was surely
"hyperbolic" and unrealistic); Carol M. Rose, Canons ofPropertyTalk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety,
108 YALE L.J. 601, 604 (1998) (arguing that Blackstone's axiom was "a rhetorical figure
describing an extreme or ideal type rather than reality"). More recently, J.E. Penner has
adopted a similar metaphor when asserting that the right to control access to private property
is "like a gate, not a wall." J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 74 (1997). At its core, he
explains, the right "permits the owner not only to make solitary use of his property, by
excluding all others, but also permits him to make a social use of his property, by selectively
excluding others, which is to say by selectively allowing some to enter." Id.
Merrill, supranote 81, at 740 (emphasis added).
Id.
Rose, supra note 82, at 604.
Id.; see also Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 327
(1985) (emphasis omitted) (asserting that the owner of private property may "determine how
the object shall be used and by whom," and that "[h]is decision is to be upheld by the society as
final").
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years ofPrivacy, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1335,1343 (1992).
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1797 (1987) (footnote omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438,478,474-75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude."89 To be sure, property
rights are about more than privacy, and privacy rights are about more than
property, but trespass law has long united the two.
In sum, modern trespass laws enforce the gatekeeper right by punishing
"entrance or presence on another person's property despite notice that the
property owner forbids it."90 This gives rise to what I'll call the blackacreprinciple
of trespass law:

'

Ifyou provide notice thatyou forbid access to your land, you may exclude
peoplefrom itfor any reasonwith the backingof criminaland tort law.9

The blackacre principle animates the note that Felix Cohen suggests we
attach to our property:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or
withhold.
Signed: Private Citizen
Endorsed: The state.92

We'll soon complicate the seeming simplicity ofthe blackacre principle,93 but
let's first explore its influence on the development of cyber-trespass law. It's no
accident that the rules of real property migrated into cyberspace. Legislators
explicitly invoked the idea of trespass in explaining the function of cyber-trespass
law, 94 and commentators have long recognized conceptual similarities between
illegal intrusions into "real" and "cyber" spaces.95 But because traditional notions

89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.

95.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1605-06; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (AM.
L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
For a good example of the blackacre principle in action, see Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,
563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997) (upholding a sizeable award of punitive damages against
trespassers, even though trespass caused no damage to land, because the harm stems from the
"loss of the individual's right to exclude others from his or her property").
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogueon PrivateProperty, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357,374 (1954).
See infra Subpart III.B (discussing how legal consent to access property can be imputed even if
factual consent is clearly lacking).
See S. REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996) (noting that the CFAA "criminalizes all computer
trespass"); see alsoSandvigv. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2018) ("[T]he government
suggests that the Court analogize the CFAA to trespass law, arguing that Congress was also
trying to prohibit the digital equivalent of trespassing.").
See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as "VirtualCrime"?, 4 CAL. CRiM. L. REV. 1, S 81
(2001) ("Hacking is obviously analogous to physical trespass. In both, the offender gains access
to an area-a physical location in trespass and a virtual location in hacking-to which she does
not lawfully have access."); Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1606, 1641 ("Computer
hacking ... is akin to a trespass in cyberspace.... Presumably the computer's owner/operator
has the primary authority to control what is authorized, much like a property owner might do
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of trespass rely on a person's physical presence in a place, courts have had to
translate certain features of trespass law into the digital realm through analogies
and comparisons. 96 This translation has happened not only with respect to what
constitutes an intrusion,'9 7 but also-and more controversially-with respect to
whether the intrusion is unauthorized.98
Although few have recognized this fact explicitly, cyber-trespass law has
approached the issue of authorization in a way that maps onto a key question in
traditional trespass law: whether the intruder has notice that the property owner
forbids their intrusion. There can be no trespass in traditionaltrespass law unless
the owner provides legally adequate notice that they don't consent to an intruder's
presence. 99 The Model Penal Code, for example, provides that a person commits
trespass if "he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is
given."' The Code then outlines three distinct forms of notice that could
establish the owner's lack of consent: (1) "actual communication"; (2) "posting in
a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders"; or (3) "fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude
intruders."0 1 Each of these forms of notice has an analog in cyber-trespass law.
I'll address each one in turn.
1.

Actual Notice: Get Off My Cyber-Lawn

The clearest form of cyber-trespass notice is when platforms give actual
notice that website access is forbidden. Think of this as the digital-age equivalent
of yelling "Get off my lawn!" 0 2 Courts have recognized this style of notice when

96.

97.
98.
99.

for physical trespass laws."); Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1153, 1144 ("The Internet has its
own kind of trespass law that closely resembles its physical-world cousin.... Unauthorized
access statutes are computer trespass statutes.... The laws prohibit trespass into a computer
network just like traditional laws ban trespass in physical space.").
See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099,1111 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ("The CFAA's
origin as a statute addressing the problem of computer 'trespass' suggests an interpretation of
the statute informed by examining general principles which govern trespass laws."); see also
Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1153-54 (arguing that interpreting the CFAA "requires
translating concepts of trespass from physical space to the new environment of computers and
networks").
Or, as most cyber-trespass laws call intrusion, "access." See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).
See Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1597, 1619-24 (distinguishing between the
distinct issues raised by interpretations of "access" and "authorization"in cyber-trespass law).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. GRAN TORINO (Matten Prods. et al 2008); see also Amy Argetsinger, Is It Offensive to Call
Bernie Sanders a 'Get Off My Lawn' Guy? No, It's Just Really Trite.,WAsH. POST (Oct. 15,
2015,
5:23
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
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platforms prominently declare that certain types of access are forbidden. In EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.,"3 for example, the First Circuit explained that
an explicit "no scrapers maybe used" statement on a travel company's homepage
could provide the "fair warning" sufficient to establish that automatically
gathering pricing information from the website was unauthorized. 14 The court
enforced the blackacre principle, declaring that "public website providers ought to
say just what non-password protected access they purport to forbid" in order to
establish what constitutes an illegal cyber-trespass. 105
Courts have approved a similar form of notice when platforms give
particularized warnings that access is forbidden. In Facebook, Inc. v. Power
Ventures, Inc.,106 the Ninth Circuit held that accessing a website becomes
unauthorized once "permission has been revoked explicitly." 0 7 Power Ventures
operated a service that gathered information from Facebook users' profiles after
the users voluntarily provided their login credentials. 108 Facebook sent Power
Ventures a cease-and-desist letter demanding that Power Ventures stop
accessing its website, even though the users themselves had consented to Power
Ventures collecting the data. 109 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Power
Ventures committed a cyber-trespass by accessing Facebook's website "after
receiving written notification from Facebook" that its conduct was forbidden."
Under Facebook, then, liability can be triggered when permission is "revoked
explicitly" in a direct communication." If a platform "own[s] and control[s]
access" to a website, it "retain [s] exclusive discretion to issue or revoke access" to
it.112

While Facebook involved a password-protected website, courts have applied
similar rules to punish people who access unprotected websites. In Southwest
Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc.,113 an airline accused another travel company of

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
112.
113.

entertainment/wp/2015/10/15/is-it-offensive-to-call-bernie-sanders-a-get-off-my-lawn-guyno-its-just-really-trite [https://perma.cc/33F6-TTZZ].
318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003).
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64.
844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1062-63; see also Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962,970 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(noting that Power Ventures had gathered the information "with the consent of users who
shared their credentials" (citing Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025,
1027 (N.D. Cal. 2012)).
Facebook, 844 F.3d at 1068.
Id. at 1067.
United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2016).
318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
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cyber-trespass for collecting information about flight times and fares from the
airline's website.1 4 The court refused to dismiss the cyber-trespass claim because
the airline had given the travel company "repeated warnings and requests to stop
scraping" and had "directly informed" the defendant that it did not consent to this
practice.1 5 Similarly, in CouponCabin,Inc. v. PriceTrace,LLC,116 a platform alleged
that its competitor gathered information about coupon codes from the platform's
publicly accessible website and then displayed the codes on its own website." 7
Upon discovering the competitor's actions, the platform sent a cease-and-desist
letter demanding that the competitor stop gathering the information, but the
competitor persisted. 118 The court held that the letter was sufficient to revoke the
competitor's permission to access the platform's website and that the continued
access plausibly stated a cyber-trespass claim.119
Some courts have expressed discomfort about applying cyber-trespass law to
publicly accessible websites even when platforms provide actual notice that access
is forbidden. In CraigslistInc.v.3Taps Inc.," the court begrudgingly assumed that
cyber-trespass law applied to the public portions of Craigslist's website and denied
a motion to dismiss the platform's claim." The court concluded that attempts by
several companies to gather information from Craigslist's website were
"unauthorized" because Craigslist had sent them cease-and-desist letters
including "clear statements" that "specifically denied authorization to use the
website 'for any purposes." 2 Despite voicing concerns about the wisdom of this
ruling,12 3 the court felt bound to apply the blackacre principle to Craigslist's
publicly accessible website in the face of murky Ninth Circuit precedent." 4

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
11 9.

120.
121.
122.

123.

124.

Id. at 439-40.
Id.
No. 18 C 7525, 2019 WL 1572448 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2019).
Id. at *1.

Id.
Id. at *2. In the end, the court dismissed the cyber-trespass claim with leave to amend because
the company failed to plead the requisite amount of damage or loss to bring civil claims under
the CFAA. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).
942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Id. at 969-70,969 n.8.
Id.; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 72 ("Words don't have to be vague or ambiguous.
Craigslist sent 3Taps a cease-and-desist letter telling it to stop scraping Craigslist's listings. The
resulting lack of authorization was crystal-clear.").
Craigslist,942 F. Supp. 2d at 970 n.8 (emphasis omitted) ("Applying the CFAA to publicly
available website information presents uncomfortable possibilities. Any corporation could
subject its competitors to civil and criminal liability for visiting its otherwise publicly available
home page; in theory, a major news outlet could seek criminal charges against competing
journalists for reading articles on its website.").
Id. (citing United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
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In a recently released decision, however, the Ninth Circuit was far less
opaque on this issue. In hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.,... LinkedIn sought to
prevent hiQ Labs from gathering information that LinkedIn's users chose to

publish on their publicly accessible profiles. 12 6 hiQ Labs had gathered the
information to conduct statistical analysis and provide insights to businesses
about their workforces.127 In response, LinkedIn sent hiQ Labs a cease-and-desist
letter declaring that " [a] ny future access of any kind" to LinkedIn's website would
be "without permission and without authorization," and therefore would violate
cyber-trespass law.128 The district court acknowledged that LinkedIn's letter had
"explicitly revoked permission" for hiQ Labs to access LinkedIn's website, but it
nonetheless held that no cyber-trespass had occurred. 129 Decisions like Facebook
were distinguishable because they involved "private data protected by an
authentication process"" and not "publicdata."" Whereas Power Ventures had
accessed parts ofFacebook's website that were "not visible to the public," hiQ Labs
had accessed LinkedIn's "publicly available website."13 2 Although it was clear that
LinkedIn had "selectively revoked permission" for hiQ Labs, the district court
concluded that cyber-trespass law shouldn't apply to "websites open to the
public"-that is, websites that contain "publicly viewable information.""3 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal, holding that there was at least a "serious
question" as to whether cyber-trespass law applies to websites that are "open to
the general public."" 4

125. 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019).
126. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 2017). LinkedIn
users can choose between different levels of exposure for their profiles, ranging from entirely
private to visible by anyone. Id. at 1104.
127. Id. (explaining that hiQ Labs "offers two products: 'Keeper,' which tells employers which of
their employees are at the greatest risk of being recruited away; and 'Skill Mapper,' which
provides a summary of the skills possessed by individual workers").
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1108.
130. Id. at 1112.
131. Id. at 1109.
132. Id.; see also id. at 1112 (describing LinkedIn as a "presumptively open public page on the
Internet" and a "publicly viewable web page open to all on the Internet").
1 33. Id. at 1109-10; see also id. at 1113 (holding that LinkedIn couldn't enforce cyber-trespass law
on "public portions of its site" or to cover "publicly viewable data not protected by an
authentication gateway").
134. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019); accord hiQ Labs, Inc. v.
LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (holding that "[a] user does not 'access' a computer
'without authorization' by using bots, even in the face of technical countermeasures, when the
data it accesses is otherwise open to the public").
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A district court in Washington D.C. reached a similar conclusion in Sandvig
v. Barr,"' after a band of academics and journalists studying housing and
employment discrimination sought to conduct research on publicly accessible
websites. 136 The researchers knew that they lacked permission to do their work
because the websites featured explicit rules forbidding scraping and requiring
advance approval to access the websites for research purposes. 137 Faced with the
specter of cyber-trespass liability, the researchers sought a judgment that their
research activities were protected by the First Amendment. 138 In a 2018 decision,
the court opened the door to this constitutional challenge after ruling that
"attempts to record the contents of public websites for research purposes are
arguably affected with a First Amendment interest."139 The court initially evaded
the constitutional questions, however, after determining that many of the
proposed research projects would "fall outside" of cyber-trespass law's reach as a
statutory matter because they merely involved "obtaining or using information
that the general public can access.""
In a subsequent decision in 2020, the Sandvig court addressed the
researchers' remaining projects and reached the same conclusion. To explain
why these projects weren't in jeopardy, the court surmised that cyber-trespass law
"contemplates a view of the internet as divided into at least two realms-public
websites (or portions of websites) where no authorization is required and private
websites (or portions of websites) where permission must be granted for
access."" Drawing on the hiQ Labs decision, the court asserted that "a website
becomes 'private' only if it is 'delineated as private through use of a permission
requirement of some sort." 2 Based on this construction, the court again dodged
the First Amendment challenge, holding that cyber-trespass law applies only on
websites that restrict access through something like a password gate, not on
websites that are "open" to anyone.14 3
The rulings in hiQ Labs and Sandvig, then, contradict the view espoused by
many courts: That the blackacre principle applies to publicly accessible websites,
particularly when platforms provide actual notice that access is restricted. In the
451 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020); see also Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018).
Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 8-10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17, 26-27 (explaining that "[s]craping or otherwise recording data from a site that is
accessible to the public is merely a particular use of information that plaintiffs are entitled to
see" under cyber-trespass law).
141. Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73,85 (D.D.C. 2020).
142. Id. (quoting hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019)).
143. Id. at 89.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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wake ofthe first Sandvig decision, Noah Feldman remarked that construing cybertrespass law in this way created "highly controversial new law" with "potentially
vast" consequences. 14" That might prove true if other courts jump aboard, but for
now these cases represent outliers given the many other jurisdictions around the
country where the blackacre principle applies to all websites so long as notice is
clear.
2.

Constructive Notice: Cyber-Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted

Actual notice is the clearest way to convey lack of consent, but it isn't the only
way. In traditional trespass actions, many jurisdictions recognize forms of
constructive notice that trigger liability-say, by posting a sign on your land to
warn offtrespassers. 145 Even if intruders fail to see the sign, they maybe liable ifthe
sign meets certain requirements or is reasonably likely to be seen and
understood. 146
Once again, courts have recognized a digital equivalent to this form ofnotice.
Instead of a "No Trespass" sign posted on your land, constructive notice of cybertrespass can occur when a platform includes "terms" or "policies" somewhere on

144. Noah Feldman, This Court Case Is Bad Newsfor Social Media Privacy, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
5,
2018,
2:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-0405/facebook-cambridge- analytica- and- a-new-free- speech-ruling
[https://perma.cc/H9K6-7BAB];see also Orin S. Kerr, Scrapinga Public Website Doesn't
Violate the CFAA, Ninth Circuit (Mostly) Holds, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 9, 2019,
7:22 PM), https://reason.com/2019/09/09/scraping-a-public-website-doesnt-violatethe-cfaa-ninth-circuit-mostly-holds [https://perma.cc/M2KF-GW6L] (unpacking the
"hugely important" hiQ decision "that embraces the open presumption of the Internet
far more clearly and directly than prior cases").
145. See, e.g., C.B.S. v. State, 184 So. 3d 611,614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
146. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). Some
jurisdictions require notice to be both "reasonable" and "explicit," even if the landowner need
not show that the intruder had actual notice. See Rayburn v. State, 300 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ga.
1983); Murphey v. State, 41 S.E. 685, 686 (Ga. 1902).
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its website.14 ' In America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc.,148 for example, operators of
pornographic websites gathered email addresses from an internet provider's
online database-an action that the court held was unauthorized because it
violated the internet provider's policies, regardless of whether the operators had
read them. 149 Likewise, in perhaps the most infamous cyber-trespass prosecution
case to date, the federal government charged activist Aaron Swartz with multiple
crimes after he downloaded academic articles from the digital library JSTOR in
violation of M.I.T.'s policies limiting the number of articles that guests could
download.15 These cases might seem similar to those outlined in the previous
Subpart, but they differ in an important respect: the blackacre principle kicks in
even if the cyber-trespassers received no actual notice that access was forbidden.
Instead, the law treats the cyber-trespassers as if they had received actual notice by
virtue of the website's terms and policies."

147. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003) ("A lack of
authorization could be established by an explicit statement on the website restricting
access.... Many webpages contain lengthy limiting conditions, including limitations on the
use of scrapers."); CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 597 F. App'x. 116, 130 (3d Cir.
2015) (suggesting that defendants could be prosecuted under the CFAA if they "breach[ed]
any. .. contractual term of use"); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int'l
Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d
1258 (11th Cir. 2010); EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 703 F. App'x. 803,808 (11th Cir. 2017)
(stating that "one of the lessons from [circuit precedent] may be that a person exceeds
authorized access if he or she uses the access in a way that contravenes any policy or term of
use governing the computer in question"); cf EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274
F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a company's attempt to gather information from a
publicly accessible website constituted unauthorized cyber-trespass because it implicitly
breached a confidentiality agreement signed by the company's vice-president); Kerr,
Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1638 (calling the court's reasoning in EF Cultural Travel
BVv. Explorica "opaque, if not tortured").
148. 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
149. See id. at 450.
150. See Wu, supra note 54 ("[T]he indictment threatening Aaron Swartz with thirty-five years in
prison depended, in part, on a terms-of-service violation: when Swartz tried to download
thousands of academic articles, he did so as an authorized guest user of the M.I.T. network. He
didn't actually 'hack' or 'break'into the network; he violated the terms of service for guests by
downloading too much stuff."). For another example of the government prosecuting someone
based in part on alleged violations of policies outlined in a website's terms of service, see United
States v. Lowson, No. 10-114 (KSH), 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12,2010).
1 51. The line between actual and constructive consent in these cases can blur, especially when there's
reason to believe that an alleged cyber-trespasser is aware that their conduct runs afoul of a
computer owner's terms or policies. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1,10 (D.D.C. 2018)
(discussing potential cyber-trespass liability when computer users are aware that their activities
will violate a website's terms of service). The important point, however, is that courts accepting
this form ofnotice will generally do so without requiringproof that the computer user is actually
aware of the terms or policies.
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The adequacy of this form of notice has generated considerable controversy,
with some courts and commentators arguing that pegging liability to opaque and
ever-shifting fine print could turn many of us into outlaws without meaningful
warning.152 This objection tracks with similar impulses in real-world trespass law,
for it reflects a skepticism that these policies are reasonably likely to be seen and
understood by website users.153 As Neil Richards asks rhetorically: "Have users
validly consented to Facebook's actions by agreeing to the Terms of Service (a
document read only by lawyers, the bored, and the paranoid)?"" Ample evidence
exists that people rarely read 15 5-let alone obey 156-what one court has described
as "those endless lists of dos and don'ts conjured up by lawyers to govern our
conduct in cyberspace."" Given this reality, one might doubt that cyber-trespass
law should treat these policies as legally adequate means of providing notice that
access is forbidden.
Courts have cached out this skepticism in various ways. Some have held that
violating website policies triggers cyber-trespass liability but then blocked liability
based on the constitutional concerns raised by vague criminal laws. In United
States v. Drew,158 for instance, the government prosecuted a mother for creating a
pseudonymous profile on the social networking website MySpace to cyberbully
her daughter's classmate-thereby violating MySpace's policies prohibiting lies
about a user's age or identity.159 Although the jury convicted the mother based on
the constructive-notice theory of cyber-trespass liability, the court ultimately
dismissed her conviction, holding that the law was unconstitutionally vague under

152.

Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (asserting that "a
violation of the terms of use of a website-without more-cannot establish liability under the
CFAA"); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting the government's
interpretation of the CFAA because it "makes every violation of a private computer use policy
a federal crime"); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting a proposed CFAA interpretation that "would impute liability to an employee who
with commendable intentions disregards his employer's policy against downloading
information to a personal computer so that he can work at home"); Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope,
supra note 38, at 1658-60.
153. Cf Rayburn v. State, 300 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ga. 1983) (outlining an analogous requirement
under trespass law in Georgia).
154.

NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 172

(2015).
1 55. See, e.g., Matthew S. Schwartz, When Not Reading the Fine Print Can Cost Your Soul, NPR
(Mar. 8, 2019, 9:55 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/08/701417140/when-not-readingthe-fine-print-can-cost-your-soul [https://perma.cc/865B-B2UE] (reporting on various
instances of people acquiescing to terms of service that would require them to clean toilets, give
up their first-born children, or sell their souls).
156. See Kerr, Vagueness, supranote 46, at 1582.
157. Sandvigv. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2018).
158. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
159. Id. at 451-52.
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these circumstances. 160 Other courts have instead interpreted cyber-trespass law
narrowly to avoid the constitutional concerns posed by such vague forms of notice.
The Ninth Circuit took this approach in United States v. Nosal,161 explaining that
violations of website policies may not trigger cyber-trespass liability because
"[s]ignificant notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability to turn on the
vagaries of private polices that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom
read.""6 2
Decisions like Drew and Nosal could be read as reflecting general concerns
about whether website policies provide adequate notice that particular conduct is
criminal, as opposed to more specific concerns about whether they provide
adequate notice that access to a website is forbidden. Under cyber-trespass law,
however, these concerns are one and the same. For example, the Nosal court
expressed concerns about interpretations of cyber-trespass law that would turn
"millions of unsuspecting individuals" into criminals based on policies "that most
people are only dimly aware of and virtually no one reads or understands."163 It is
thus the very nature of cyber-trespass law-which toggles liability on a private
actor's consent-that animates concerns about whether notice of liability is
adequate. 164 This differentiates cyber-trespass law from some other criminal laws
challenged on vagueness grounds. The notice problem in cyber-trespass law isn't
that ambiguous or opaque statutory terms impede notice of liability, but that the
concept of authorization itself requires legally adequate notice about what's
unauthorized. That's why courts fret about tying liability to a website's policies:
Because "website owners retain the right to change the terms at any time and
without notice[,]" there's a real risk that "behavior that wasn't criminal yesterday
can become criminal today without an act of Congress, and without any notice
whatsoever."165
3.

Implicit Notice: Digital Fences

A third form of notice that may support cyber-trespass liability is implicit
notice, which derives from technological features that restrict access to a website.
These features form part of a website's architecture, much like how architectural
features can impede entry into real property. For example, a password gate can

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 467.
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 860.
Id. at 859, 861.
See Grimmelmann, supra note 65, at 1501-02.
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.
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inhibit access to a website in a way that's analogous to a lock preventing intrusion
into a home.
The relationship between architecture and notice lies in the message that
different forms of architecture communicate to outsiders. A landowner can
convey that access to land is forbidden by taking steps to prevent intruders from
entering it freely. 166 Erecting fences around your land, for instance, carries legal
weight because it communicates to outsiders that the land is private and entry is
restricted. Similarly, courts have recognized that various forms of digital "fencing"
might provide implicit notice that access to a website is forbidden. 167
In many cases of cyber-trespass, the lack of consent is obvious even if it's
implicit. Stealing your boss's password to hack into their Gmail account is
precisely the sort of intrusion that cyber-trespass law has always sought to
punish.168 Neither Google nor your boss needs to tell you that you lack permission
to access their emails; rather, the lack of consent is implied by Google's
architectural requirement that your boss protect their inbox with a password (as
well as your boss's decision not to tell you their password).
In other cases, however, the relationship between architecture and notice is
more complicated. Consider United States v. Auernheimer,169 where a security
researcher17 discovered that AT&T had published its customers' email addresses
166. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (providing that
lack of consent can be conveyed through "fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to
exclude intruders"). Some courts describe this form of notice as constructive rather than
implicit when it involves a type of fencing that adheres to certain statutoryrequirements. See,
e.g., V.B. v. State, 959 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the "constructive
notice" that an intruder might have if a landowner erected "a fence of substantial construction"
that "stands at least 3 feet in height" (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.011(7) (2006)). It might make
sense to describe notice by fencing as constructive when assessing adherence to predetermined
statutory requirements for fencing as providing legally sufficient notice. But in most instances,
it's more coherent to think of fencing providing implicit notice because it conveys the owner's
lack of consent to intrudersby implication, as compared to the forms of actual and constructive
notice that tend to be explicit. See supra Subparts II.A.1-2.
167. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58,63 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that "lack
of authorization maybe implicit, ratherthan explicit").
168. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2487 ("In
intentionally trespassing into someone else's computer files, the offender obtains at the very
least information as to how to break into that computer system.").
169. 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014).
170. I use the term security researcher here because I believe it best captures the role that the
defendant, Andrew Auernheimer, played in the events that led to his prosecution in this
case. I note, however, that Auernheimer also goes by the name of "weev" and has been
accused of appalling cyberharassment, the effects of which are powerfully captured in
Danielle Citron's interviews with a woman Auernheimer targeted with online abuse. See
CITRON, supra note 63, at 252; see also Rachel Gutman, Who Is Weev, and Why Did He Derail
a
Journalist's
Career?,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
14,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/who-is-weev/
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on publicly accessible websites with "hard-to-guess" website addresses." The
researcher collected thousands of these email addresses and turned them over to
the press to expose the flaw in AT&T's security measures.7 He was criminally
prosecuted and served over a year in jail before the Third Circuit vacated his
conviction on other grounds. 1 Although the appellate court ultimately declined
to assess whether his actions constituted cyber-trespass, the briefing on appeal
reflected competing visions of how to think of notice when a website has an
obscure address butis still publicly accessible. The government compared AT&T's
website to a private home where a physical trespass occurs "when an unauthorized
person enters someone else's residence, even when the front door is left open or
unlocked."" The researcher, by contrast, analogized the website to a public space
because its architecture "ma[d]e the information available to everyone and thereby
authorized the general public to view the information."" We don't know which
analogy would have prevailed, but we do know that the researcher's prosecution
and conviction sent a chill down the spines of others doing digital research. 176
One of the earliest cyber-trespass cases can also be understood as a decision
about implicit notice. In United States v. Morris," a graduate student was
convicted of cyber-trespass because he used weaknesses in various computer
programs to illustrate security flaws in the early internet. The Second Circuit said
that his access was unauthorized because he had used the programs in ways that
were not "in any way related to their intended function."178 The court didn't
elaborate on how this standard operates, but it appeared to incorporate implicit
notice into the concept of "unauthorized access" by suggesting that owners
implicitly authorize uses of their computer programs to perform intended
functions but implicitly refuse to authorize uses that involve unintended
functions. 179 In a sense, this remains a matter of architecture-the way that the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

176.
177.
178.
179.

553295 [https://perma.cc/Q39G-9CHG] (discussing Auernheimer's white-supremacist and
antisemitic acts as the manager of Neo-Nazi website The Daily Stormer).
Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1155.
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 531.
Id. at 529 (vacating the conviction on venue grounds).
Brief for Appellee at 34, Auernheimer, 748 F.3d (No. 13-1816).
Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, Auernheimer, 748 F.3d (No. 13-1816); see also Orin Kerr, More
Thoughts on the Six CFAA Scenarios About Authorized Access vs. UnauthorizedAccess, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/01/28/more-thoughts-on-thesix-cfaa-scenarios-about-authorized-access-vs-unauthorized-access [https://perma.cc/QH6TV4MF] (making a similar argument based on a hypothetical college admissions counselor who
publishes admissions decisions online using a unique website address for each applicant).
See infra Subpart II.B.
928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 510.
See id.; see also Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1632.
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programs were designed to function is what provides implicit notice about which
uses are permitted and which are forbidden.
Our understanding of cyber-trespass notice-actual, constructive, and
implicit-must now reckon with a hot-off-the-press decision from the nation's
highest court. In June 2021, the Supreme Court shed new light on the scope of
cyber-trespass law in Van Buren v. United States.180 The case involved the criminal
prosecution of a police sergeant, Nathan Van Buren, who searched for a license
plate on a government database.181 Innocuous as that act might sound, the
government snared Van Buren in a sting because he ran the search in exchange for
money.182 He was convicted of a felony CFAA violation. Specifically, the
government argued that he violated the statute's "exceeds authorized access"
clause because the police department had trained him to access the database for
"law enforcement purposes," not personal reasons. 183 The Court ultimately
rejected this argument, invalidating Van Buren's conviction because he was
authorized to access the database "even though he obtained information from the
database for an improper purpose."184
Although the decision clearly settled Van Buren's fate, the implications for
future cases are much murkier. The Court explained that cyber-trespass liability
turns on a "gates-up-or-down inquiry,"185 under which a person's access is
unauthorized if they bypass a "gate" that's "down." This analogical standard
sounds straightforward in theory, but we're still guessing what it means in practice.
Indeed, in a brief filed in hiQ Labs just days after the Court decided Van Buren,
LinkedIn argued that there's a "pressing need" to clarify what "methods of denying
and revoking authorization... qualify as 'gates-down"' because Van Buren
"explicitly declined to say what qualifies as a gate."186 It's true that LinkedInhaving lost in the Ninth Circuit-had selfish reasons to accentuate the need for
Supreme Court review in hiQ Labs, but it i's tough to rebut the platform's
argument. We might charitably describe Van Buren as opaque. The majority
opinion largely paraphrased other people's arguments, with at-best implicit
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021).
Id. at 1653.
Id.
Id. at 1652-53.
Id. at 1662.
Id. at 1658; see also Orin Kerr, The Supreme CourtReins In the CFAA in Van Buren, LAWFARE
(June 9, 2021, 9:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-reins-cfaa-van-buren
[https://perma.cc/ZD65-YBMN] (observing that Van Buren tells us that "[t]he statute is all
about gates: When a gate is closed to a user, the user can't wrongfully bypass the gate").
186. Petitioner's Supplemental Brief at 2-3, LinkedIn Corp. v. hiQ Labs, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021)
(No. 19-1116), 2021 WL 2382462, at *2-3.
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holdings flowing from the Court's endorsement or rejection of how Van Buren,
the government, or the dissent framed the issues. 187 When it came time to apply
those inferences to the facts, the Court offered scant analysis. All we know for sure
is that, in this case, the gate was "up"for Van Buren because his employer gave him
permission to access the database along with the technical credentials to do so. 188
Orin Kerr-whose scholarship and amicus briefwere cited repeatedly in Van
Buren 189-believes the Court's decision "settles that the CFAA is fundamentally a
trespass statute"because "[t] he basic wrong is bypassing a closed gate, going where
you're not supposed to go." 190 He bases his conclusion, in part, on what appears to
be Van Buren's main holding: a person's access is unauthorized if he enters
"particularareas of the computer-such as files, folders, or databases-that are off
limits to him."191 But what does "off limits" mean for future cyber-trespass
defendants? There are, I think, at least two possibilities.
The first is that cyber-trespass liability might hinge exclusively on technical
authentication. To use Van Buren's terminology, a person would illegally bypass
a lowered gate only if they access a computer without technical authorizationmost commonly an authentication credential like a password. To determine what
counts as off-limits access, we might look to the Court's observation in footnote 9
that the "gates-up-or-down reading also aligns with the CFAA's prohibition on
password trafficking" in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) 192-a
prohibition that
"contemplates a 'specific type of authorization-that is, authentication,' which
turns on whether a user's credentials allow him to proceed past a computer's access
gate, rather than on other, scope-based restrictions."193 The Court capped off
footnote 9 with a telling citation to A DictionaryofComputing,noting its definition
of "authorization" as a "process by which users, having completed
an ... authentication stage, gain or are denied access to particular resources based
on their entitlement." 194 In short, cyber-trespass liability might extend no further
than what some colloquially call "hacking": penetrating a technological barrier
configured to block your access.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1654-62.
Id. at 1662.
Id. at 1652, 1659 n.8, 1661, 1662 n.12.
Kerr, supra note 185.
Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1662.
Id. at 1659 n.9; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(6) (barring the sale of "any password or similar
information through which a computer may be accessed without authorization").
193. Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1659 n.9 (quoting Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to
UnauthorizedAccess Under the ComputerFraudandAbuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1442,

1470 (2016)).
194. Id. (quoting A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 30 (John Daintith & Edmund Wright eds., 2008)).
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The other possibility is that Van Buren's gates-up-or-down inquiry supports
a broader, and perhaps more nuanced, understanding of what may constitute offlimits access. In a puzzling move, the Court cryptically remarked in footnote 8 that
"[f]or present purposes, we need not address whether this [gates-up-or-down]
inquiry turns only on technological (or 'code-based') limitations on access, or
instead also looks to limits contained in contracts or policies."195 Although the
Court's opinion above the line implied that such contracts or policies were
analytically irrelevant under cyber-trespass law, footnote 8 tossed up a smidgen of
uncertaintyfrom belowthe line. To be sure, plenty of dicta in Van Buren suggested
that violating awritten policy, like a term of service, would be insufficient to trigger
cyber-trespass liability. 196 But the Court's caveat might turn out to be doctrinally
influential, at least until the justices decide to hear another cyber-trespass case.
In the meantime, let's attempt to read the tea leaves. How, if at all, might
policy-based limits affect cyber-trespass liability in a post-Van Buren world?
Perhaps, as Kerr has speculated, these restrictions might help courts determine
which architectural features are legally salient. In his view, "the line between real
barrier and mere speed bump can be subtle" because the distinction isn't "just
about technology, but also [our] social understandings of technology." 197 Van
Buren, then, hints that not all technological measures are created equal and
"leaves to lower courts the largely interstitial work of figuring out the hard linedrawing of what exactly counts as enough of a closed gate to trigger liability." 198
Authentication offers one way to lower a gate, but it might not be the only way.
What's more, perhaps authentication isn't the be-all and end-all ofcyber-trespass
liability. Imagine, for example, that a platform conceals a webpage behind a
password gate but then publishes a blogpost stating that any user may access the
webpage with the password "NO_Tr~sp@ss ing!" Surely any sensible gates-up-ordown inquiry would conclude that the platform has, despite its authentication
requirement, raised the gate and nullified potential cyber-trespass liability. Put
differently, this hypothetical might be an example of a policy altering how courts
should treat technological barriers that would otherwise be legally sufficient.
Alternatively, footnote 8 might suggest that some policy-based restrictions
can trigger cyber-trespass liability even if those in Van Buren were inadequate. An
interesting but underappreciated feature of Van Buren's case is that he never
seemed to violate an explicit or written rule against using the database for personal
reasons. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit made any mention

1 95. Id. at 1659 n.8.
196. Id. at 1661-62.
197. Kerr, supra note 185.
198. Id.
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of such a rule. The court of appeals concluded that Van Buren's access was
unauthorized based on his admission that he knew his actions were "wrong," as
well as another government employee's trial testimony "that the database is
supposed to be used for law-enforcement purposes only and that officers are
trained on the proper and improper uses of the system."199 Likewise, the Supreme
Court observed laconically that trial evidence showed Van Buren "had been
trained not to use the law enforcement database for 'an improper purpose,' defined
as 'any personal use."'0
A different policy-in form or substance-could yield different results in
future cases. Given the importance of consent in cyber-trespass law, footnote 8
might open a small window for other forms of notice to sustain liability under a
gates-up-or-down inquiry. A conservative reading of Van Buren could plausibly
support a narrow holding that reconciles footnotes 8 and 9: a computer owner
can't conditionally withhold their consent to access the computer based solely on
a user's improper purpose.2 01 Other hypotheticals aren't squarely resolved by this
more modest rule. Envisage an online database with an admonitory clickthrough notice (e.g., "Youraccess is categorically unauthorized if you've accepted
a bribe in exchange for disclosing information from this database."); or a
streaming service with a cautionary pop-up screen for users with foreign IP
addresses (e.g., "You're forbidden from accessing this content if you're located in
the United Kingdom."); or a platform that automatically sends personalized ceaseand-desist emails to high-traffic users (e.g., "We think you're using a scraper, Mr.
Kadri. Our site is now off limits to you. The gate is down!"). Do any of these
written notices count as "gates" under Van Buren? And, if they do, may the words
alone bring the gate "down" even if there's little or no technical impediment to the
user's website access? 2 02
It's too soon to answer these questions, but I'll hazard a pair of high-level
predictions to ground the remainder of my argument. First, even if technical
architecture isn't dispositive, Van Buren likely envisions a gates-up-or-down
inquiry that affords great weight to a website's design. And second, basing CFAA
liability purely on policy violations is precarious, especially given the Court's
concern that "millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens" would become criminals

199. United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2019).
200. Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1653.
201. Or, perhaps, a user's authorization to access a computer can't be vitiated by their improper
purpose.
202. Let's say, for example, that the online database doesn't have an authentication requirement (to
control who could access it), the streaming service doesn't use geo-blocking (to control where
it could be accessed), and the platform doesn't use rate limiting (to control how much it could
be accessed).
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if it interpreted the "exceeds authorized access" clause in a way that "criminalizes
every violation of a computer-use policy."" Even if these two predictions prove
true, the blackacre principle would remain powerful. For starters, any lingering
uncertainty will favor criminal prosecutions and civil claims because prosecutors
can use doctrinal doubts to secure plea bargains even if their most ambitious
charges wouldn't ultimately stick, while plaintiffs can use ambiguity to their
advantage in drafting cease-and-desist letters and surviving early motions to
dismiss. In addition, Van Buren's textualist CFAA interpretation wouldn't apply
to state cyber-trespass laws with different statutory language, such as California's
prohibition on using any data "without permission" in order to "wrongfully
control or obtain money, property, or data."" Plaintiffs might increasingly turn
to state cyber-trespass laws if federal counterparts aren't doing the trick. And
finally, Congress might revisit cyber-trespass law by amending the CFAA or
passing new laws to fill any liability gaps opened by Van Buren. In light of these
ongoing dynamics, it's important to assess the wisdom (and constitutionality) of
the blackacre principle.
This Subpart has traced the blackacre principle's roots from Blackstone's era
to the modern-day internet. For Blackstone, it meant that landowners had a
gatekeeper right under trespass law to exclude people from their property for any
reason, so long as they provided notice that presence was forbidden. Nowadays, in
cyberspace, the blackacre principle applies in a different context but with a similar
effect: platforms may invoke it to bring cyber-trespass claims, provided that they
convey their lack of consent to a person accessing their websites. There are, to be
sure, cracks in the foundations of the blackacre principle's application to the
internet-some courts have curtailed the forms of notice that are legally adequate,
while others have cast doubt on the principle's application to publicly accessible
websites. What matters, though, is that platforms have plenty of precedent on their
side that they can use to deter people from accessing their websites without their
permission. The following Subpart explores how this precedent has emboldened
platforms to restrict digital research that goes against their interests.
B.

My House, My Rules: The Blackacre Principle and Private Governance

Building on this background of legal doctrine, this Subpart analyzes how
platforms have embraced the blackacre principle to curb digital research as a matter

203.

204.

Van Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1661 (expressing concern that "the Government's interpretation of the
[CFAA] would attach criminal penalties to a breathtaking amount of commonplace computer
activity").
CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(1) (West 2020).
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of private governance. My interviews with researchers and platform employees
reveal how platforms have developed policies that reflect both the blackacre
principle and current cyber-trespass doctrine.
Platforms have adopted quite different approaches to managing their
relationships with outside researchers. Despite the platforms' policies against
scraping, they've selectively waived certain restrictions when it suits them.
Facebook, for example, allows a small group of lucky outsiders to access and
analyze information on its platform through data-sharing partnerships with
particular researchers. Twitter, meanwhile, offers access to troves of information
through its Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to those researchers who
are willing to pay. By contrast, LinkedIn erects technological barriers to prevent
researchers from developing competing services that rely on publicly accessible
information about LinkedIn's users.
Despite these differences, the ethos behind the platforms' approaches is the
same: My House, My Rules. The platforms' internal rules outline what's permitted
and what's forbidden on their websites, much like property owners might enforce
the blackacre principle by granting and denying consent to access their land. All
of their approaches-even Twitter's more permissive scheme-create chilling
effects on research because the researchers' access is at best circumscribed and at
worst nonexistent. To top it all off, this system of private governance creates a risk
that any research that platforms allowbe disparaged as skewed or compromised. 20
In one particularly illuminating interview, I spoke with a journalist who
insisted on anonymity because he was worried that his research might jeopardize
his immigration status in the United States since it potentially violates cybertrespass law. He has relied heavily on digital research during his time as a journalist
at various news outlets. According to him, the criminal charges brought against
the likes of Aaron Swartz and Andrew Auernheimer "scared everyone" in his line
of work, and cyber-trespass law has become the "elephant in the room" for
journalists doing digital research.206 He knows that his research could get him
sued, but he also recognizes that he enjoys the privilege of having good lawyers and
a job at a higher-profile news outlet. This privilege means that journalists like him
can sometimes gamble on the assumption that platforms won't sue him because it
would look bad. In moments when he is willing to roll the dice, he does a "CFAA
Shruggy"-a quip he used to convey the sense among his colleagues that "the
CFAA probably prohibits this, but let's do it anyway."207 This strategy has its risks,

205. See Kadri, supra note 1.
206. Interview with Anonymous Journalist, supra note 14.
207. Id.
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"

though: In one instance, Facebook threatened to issue a cease-and-desist letter
after he built a tool to gather information from his own Facebook page. As we've
seen, this letter alone could have triggered cyber-trespass liability had he
proceeded with his research.
Surveying the current lay of the land, the journalist remarked that "Twitter
tends to be chill about sharing data, but everyone has become more restrictive in
the last three or four years."208 Even when platforms like Twitter allow some
external access through their APIs, concerns remain: "It's easier if a platform has
an API," he noted, "but permission to use the API often depends on who you
know."2 09 Facebook, meanwhile, is "very selective" about who can study its
platform.210 "They make you go through a whole process," he reported, "but it's
bullshit anyway because they don't give you access to all the data," which means
that "they decide what you can research."2 " Despite these challenges, he hopes that
his cutting-edge style of journalism will become routine practice in the future, as
others join him in doing digital research to oversee how platforms shape online
discourse. "In five years," he said, "the work we do should be as banal as the work
of a health inspector."2
This journalist is far from alone in feeling the effects of cyber-trespass law on
his work. A recent studyby Joseph Lorenzo Hall and Stan Adams sheds light on how
security researchers operate in the shadow of cyber-trespass law. Half of the
researchers they interviewed reported that cyber-trespass law was a primary source
of risk to their work.2" Of those researchers, over half admitted to avoiding types of
research that they feared could implicate cyber-trespass law.214 Adams told me that
many researchers were concerned by how the law "weaponizes terms of service" by
posing a "weightier threat" than the terms of service alone. 215 This concern creates a
chilling effect on their research. Many researchers told Hall and Adams that they
"tried to avoid the CFAA at all costs," and, according to Adams, "few wanted to wade
into a treacherous project."2 1 6 Adams also noted that cyber-trespass law affected the
types of researchers who were willing to take on certain projects: "Academics with
good legal teams were more willing" to pursue risker approaches, he said, as were
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

213.

JOSEPH LORENZO HALL & STAN ADAMS, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., TAKING THE PULSE OF
HACKING: A RISK BASIS FOR SECURITY RESEARCH 9 (2018).
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215. Interview with Stan Adams, Open Internet Couns., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. (Mar. 4,
2019).
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people who felt they could "remain suitably anonymous."21 After gaining these
insights into the effect that cyber-trespass law has on researchers, Adams believes
that the law must strike a different balance. When asked how we might think about
the division between "public" and "private" cyberspaces, he asserted that "there
should be something more than terms of service to make something private in the
eyes ofthe law."218
Journalist and activist Cory Doctorow also talked to me about his concerns
that cyber-trespass law creates "chilling effects" on research. 219 "The iceberg is
almost entirely under the surface here," he said, because "the impact of the CFAA
almost never surfaces.""' Research that would otherwise be conducted is snuffed
out from the start and, perhaps more worryingly, legal counsel will encourage
researchers to bury their findings instead of publishing them for fear that it could
land them in trouble." Doctorow expressed particular concerns about instances
when "security researchers discover a security flaw and their general counsel will
tell them to keep it to themselves." 2 The news that researchers were already aware
of the flaw often spills out only after a malicious actor exploits it, when it's already
too late to address it.2 2 3
Although the platforms have generally adopted restrictive rules that paint
their websites as blackacres, the language that they use to describe their services
publicly is often quite different. Mark Zuckerberg has likened Facebook to the
"town square,"24 while the platform's filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission speak of cultivating leaders around the world willing to fight for the
"right to share what they want and the right to access all information that people
want to share with them."2 2 5 Twitter, meanwhile, declares that its "purpose is to
serve the public conversation." 2 26 The platform also asserts that "Twitteris what's
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embedded video).
225. Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 68 (Feb. 1, 2012).
226. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
[https://perma.cc/574U-QRBH] (last visited Oct. 28, 2021); see also id. ("Our rules are to
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happening in the world and what people are talking about right now," and that the
data available on its website is "public" information "that users have chosen to
share with the world."" Even LinkedIn holds itself out as a place "to meet,
exchange ideas, [and] learn," which its competitors have argued makes it "a
modern-day equivalent of the shopping mall or town square, a marketplace of
ideas on a previously unimaginable scale."2 28 These characterizations of the social
role played by platforms stand in tension with their legal status as blackacres under
cyber-trespass law-an issue addressed in the following Part.
III.

CHALLENGING THE BLACKACRE PRINCIPLE IN CYBER-TRESPASS LAW

'

Let me return to the blackacre principle of trespass law: If you provide notice
that you forbid access to your land, you may exclude people from it for any reason
with the backing of criminal and tort law. We've now seen that the blackacre
principle has applied in cyber-trespass law in a similar way: If you provide notice
that you forbid access to your website, you may exclude people from it for any
reason with the backing of criminal and tort law.2 29 In real-world trespass law, the
effect of the blackacre principle is that landowners may deter people from
accessing their land without their consent. In cyber-trespass law, however, the
practical effect is slightly different. Not only may website owners deter people
from accessing their websites without their consent, but they may also deter people
from obtaininginformation2

227. About Twitter's APIs, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-api
[https://perma.cc/CQR7-TF2H] (last visited Oct. 28, 2021) (claiming that "Twitter data is
unique from data shared by most other social platforms because it reflects information that
users choose to share publicly").
228. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
229. The reverse is also true: Ifyou fail to provide legally adequate notice, courts will generally refuse
to impose liability for cyber-trespass because there was no way of knowing that you did not
consent to a computer user's access. See Healthcare Advocs., Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer
& Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that a law firm's gathering of
information from a publicly accessible website did not constitute cyber-trespass because the
firm had no way of knowing that consent was lacking); but see Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an internet service provider's
search of a publicly accessible online database constituted cyber-trespass even though the
database owner objected long after the search by filing a lawsuit); Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope,
supra note 38, at 1639-40 (bestowing "the award for the broadest interpretation" of cybertrespass law to the judge who decided the Register.com case on this ground).
230. Recall, too, that cyber-trespass law treats the act of merely viewing a website as tantamount to
obtaining information. See, e.g., HealthcareAdvocs., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (explaining that
"[v]iewing material on a computer screen constitutes 'obtaining' information under the
CFAA").
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This jurisprudence leads to what Mark Lemley has described as a "serious
problem" with cyber-trespass law: It has become "illegal-indeed, criminal-to
seek information from a publicly available website" against the website owner's
wishes. 231 This problem was serious when Lemley recognized it eighteen years ago,
and it has grown worse as dominant platforms have increasingly invoked the
blackacre principle to police the publicly accessible parts of their websites, often
with the backing of the courts. 232 More recently, Amy Kapczynski has lamented
how platforms may invoke cyber-trespass law to "forbid users from undertaking
research that might disclose aspects of their platform's functioning."2 " Jane
Bambauer, meanwhile, has noted the possible constitutional infirmity of cybertrespass law in that it allows sweeping regulation of information flows. 234
In response, both prosecutors and platforms have argued that websites are
"merely private property," meaning that a platform "can deny access to anyone it
wishes, for any reason."2" As Laurent Sacharoff has skeptically noted, this
argument flows quite logically if you accept the premise that websites are like
private property in the real world: "If the government criminalizes a person who
accesses such a website in violation of the website's rules, they have merely
criminalized a trespass analogous to a criminal trespass in the real world that
would occur if a person refused to leave the premises after being told to leave."236

231. Mark A. Lemley, Placeand Cyberspace,91 CAL. L. REv. 521, 528 (2003) (criticizing the use of a
website's terms of service to establish the scope of authorization); see also Mark A. Lemley, The
Splinternet, 70 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1424-25 (2021) (discussing how cyber-trespass law and
copyright law have united to give platforms power to control information flows); Jane R.
Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 957 (2017) [hereinafter
Bambauer, Empirical] (expressing concern that laws like the CFAA "apply serious civil and
criminal penalties to anybody who accesses a website for a purpose that violates the website's
terms of service, even when the website is available to the public without password
protection").
232. See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003); Craigslist
Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969-70, 969 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (endorsing the
blackacre principle for publicly accessible websites, albeit begrudgingly). But see hiQ Labs,
273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (rejecting the blackacre principle for publicly accessible websites).
233. Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 1502-03 (2020)
(reviewing SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) and JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH
AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019)) (noting how

the impact of platform-written contracts is "dramaticallyamplified by overbroad laws" like the
CFAA).
234. Bambauer, Empirical, supranote 231, at 956-58.
235. Laurent Sacharoff, Russia Gave Bots a Bad Name. Here's Why We Need Them More
Than Ever, POLITICO MAG., (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine
/story/2018/08/14/russia-gave-bots-a-bad-name-heres-why-we-need-them-morethan-ever-219359 [https://perma.cc/T3QG-P7LS].
236. Id.
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This premise, however, deserves more than mere skepticism. It deserves
constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment. The following Subpart
explains why.
A.

Constitutional Coverage: The Internet as a Medium
for Communication

If cyber-trespass law is just like real-world trespass law, one might think that
the First Amendment should not even enter the picture. Trespass laws are laws of
general applicability that don't provoke constitutional scrutiny simply by affecting
your ability to engage in activities that are otherwise protected by the First
Amendment. 27 To use an obvious example, the First Amendment doesn't prevent
you from suing me for trespass if I enter your home, even if my motivation is to
uncover information of great importance. 23 Why, then, should cyber-trespass law
raise any First Amendment concerns?
To help answer this question, we must first tease out the distinction between
constitutional coverage and constitutional protection under the First
Amendment. 239 To say that the First Amendment covers particular conduct is to
say that courts must employ First Amendment analysis to determine whether
regulating the conduct is constitutional.2 0 To say that the First Amendment
protects that conduct, by contrast, is to say that courts should rule that the
regulation of that conduct is unconstitutional.241 In other words, the coverage

237. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663,669 (1991) (" [G]enerally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news."); Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345,
1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (" [T]he media have no general immunity from tort or contract liability.");
RICHARDs, supra note 154, at 60-61 (discussing "the uncontroversial idea in First Amendment
law that the press or other speakers have no exemption from 'generally applicable laws"').
238. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 n.19 (2001) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 691 (1972)) ("It would be frivolous to assert-and no one does in these cases-that the
First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the
reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws."); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691
("Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy
information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct,
whatever the impact on the flow of news."); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th
Cir. 1971) ("The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity
from torts or crimes committed during the course ofnewsgathering. The First Amendment is
not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means .... ").
239. See Frederick Schauer, Categoriesand the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 265,267 (1981); Amanda Shanor, FirstAmendment Coverage,93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 318, 32430(2018).
240. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the FirstAmendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713,
714 (2000).
241. Id.
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question concerns the threshold issue of whether the First Amendment even
applies, whereas the protection question addresses the ultimate issue of what
judgments the First Amendment requires in particular cases. 242
It might not be immediately obvious why a constitutional provision
protecting "the freedom of speech" would apply to cyber-trespass law, which
regulates our ability to access information from websites-conduct that, at first
blush, might appear disconnected from anyone's freedom to speak.2 4 Tempting
as it might be to believe that the First Amendment's Free Speech clause covers all
speech or covers only speech, such misconceptions ignore our constitutional
doctrine. Some regulations of speech raise no First Amendment concerns, while
other regulations raise First Amendment concerns even though they don't directly
regulate speech.244 Establishing that a law regulates something we might
colloquially describe as "speech" is neither necessary nor sufficient to rouse the
First Amendment.

How, then, are courts to answer the coverage question? They must engage in
what Robert Post calls "constitutional sociology" in order to identify the "forms of
social interaction that realize First Amendment values."" These forms of social
interaction comprise a doctrinal category known as media for communication. 24
Over the years, this category has evolved to include different media that gain this
particular type ofsocial salience, with courts extending medium-based coverage to
new forms of social interaction, from books to movies to music.247 As the Supreme
Court explained when extending coverage to regulations of video games,
"whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing
technology, 'the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First
Amendment's command, do not vary' when a new and different medium for
communication appears."2 48 To recognize that a particular social practice falls into

242. Id.
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
244. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1765-84 (2004); Mark Tushnet, The
Coverage/ProtectionDistinction in the Law of Freedom ofSpeech-An Essay on Meta-Doctrine
in ConstitutionalLaw, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1073, 1074 (2017); Post, supra note 240, at
715, 715 n.14.
245. Post, supra note 240 at 716,722; see alsoThomas E. Kadri, DrawingTrump Naked: Curbing the
Right of Publicity to ProtectPublic Discourse, 78 MD. L. REV. 899, 901 n.4, 917-19, 941-42
(2019) (justifying constitutional protection for expressive works based on this style of inquiry).
246. Post, supra note 240, at 716; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (holding
that movies are covered by the First Amendment because "motion pictures are a significant
medium for the communication of ideas").
247. See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011); Shanor, supra note 239, at 321
(observing that "the boundaries of the First Amendment are dynamic, not static").
248. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790 (quotingJosephBurstyn, 343 U.S. at 503).
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this category doesn't render it immune from regulation; it does, however, bring the
First Amendment into play when the government regulates such a medium.
Websites unquestionably qualify as media of communication under the First
Amendment.24 9 Even when the internet was in its infancy, the Supreme Court
recognized its tremendous potential to shape how we communicate. In Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union,"' the Court described the internet as a "dynamic,
multifaceted category of communication" that "includes not only traditional print
and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, realtime dialogue."2 " The Court waxed poetic about the internet's role in realizing First
Amendment values: "Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox. Through the use ofWeb pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer."2 " Though some of this language might
now seem a tad dated, it's still consistent with the internet's constitutional
significance to this day.
Some twenty years later, the Court revisited the internet's role in modern life
in Packingham v. North Carolina,"'a case that can help us answer the coverage
question for cyber-trespass law. Not only does Packinghamelucidate the vital role
that websites play as First Amendment media for communication, but it also
concerns a law that-like cyber-trespass law-regulates access to websites. North
Carolina had made it a felony for registered sex offenders to "access" any
"commercial social networking" website if the sex offender knew that minors
could become members or have personal profiles on it.254 The statute used criteria
that evoked the concept of First Amendment media, defining these websites as
those that provide "mechanisms to communicate" and that enable "information
exchanges.""
In judging the statute's constitutionality, the Court framed the internet's First
Amendment significance by comparing it to places in the real world where courts

249. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 861 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ("The Internet is a means
for communicating via computers[.]"); Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
928 F.3d 226,237 (2d Cir. 2019) ("As a general matter, social media is entitled to the same First
Amendment protections as other forms of media."); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct.
1730, 1732 (2017) (holding that a statute preventing registered sex offenders from accessing
social media sites was covered by the First Amendment and describing social media use as
"protected First Amendment activity").
250. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
251. Id. at 870.
252. Id.
253. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
254. Id. at 1733 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (West 2015)).
255. Id. at 1733-34.

Platforms as Blackacres

1227

recognize constitutional interests in a "spatial context."" 6 The Court noted that
the First Amendment protects rights to "speak and listen" in places where people
gather, such as parks and streets, because a "fundamental principle of the First
Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and
listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more.""' Turning to the
internet, the Court declared elaborately: "While in the past there may have been
difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the
exchange ofviews, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace-the 'vast democratic
2
"'
forums of the Internet' in general, and social media in particular."
Although the Packingham Court set the stage by using spatial concepts and
mentioning the First Amendment's forum analysis that applies to parks and
streets,25 9 a careful reading of the opinion suggests that the coverage analysis
actually turned on the status ofwebsites as First Amendment media.2 "' According
to the Court, the websites covered by the statute offer "capacity for communication
of all kinds"2 1 and allow people to "gain access to information and communicate
with one another about it."2" 2 Facebook, for example, provides people with a
platform to "debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors";
LinkedIn enables people to "look for work, advertise for employees, or review tips
on entrepreneurship"; and Twitter gives people the opportunity to "petition their
elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner."2 33
The Court explained that these websites are "integral to the fabric of our modern
society and culture" and "provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard" in today's world. 2 4 Yet
North Carolina had regulated certain people's ability to access them. As a result,
the statute had to face First Amendment scrutiny.
Packingham provides important guidance when assessing the constitutional
implications of cyber-trespass law. The Court applied First Amendment analysis
to judge the statute's constitutionality because North Carolina had regulated
access to a First Amendment medium-websites. 265 To make matters worse, the

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 1735.
Id.
Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,868 (1997)).
Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989)).
See id. at 1736 (describing the modern internet as a "medium" and noting that the Court "must
exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant
protection for access to vast networks in that medium").
261. Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
262. Id. at 1737.
263. Id. at 1735.
264. Id. at 1737-38.
265. See id. at 1736.
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statute targeted websites based on their ability to serve the very social practices that
justify constitutional coverage in this area-communicating and exchanging
information with everyone from close friends to the general public.2 66 Note, too,
that the statute triggered First Amendment scrutiny even though it regulated
access to websites run by privately owned platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and
Twitter, and even though liability under the statute turned on a decision left
entirely to the platform's discretion.2 67 All of these factors apply with equal force
to cyber-trespass law. If anything, cyber-trespass law raises louder First
Amendment alarms because of its broad reach. Although the Packingham Court
claimed that North Carolina's statute was "unprecedented in the scope of First
Amendment speech it burdens," cyber-trespass lawgoverns access bymore people
(everyone) to more websites (all of them) and permits more liability (criminal and
civil) on more grounds (any ground)."' At a minimum, then, cyber-trespass law
should face First Amendment scrutiny.2 69
266. See id. at 1735-37 (explaining that platforms have become "the principal sources for knowing
current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public
square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge").
267. See id. at 1733-34 (hinging liability on whether the platforms allowed minors to become
members or have personal profiles on the website).
268. Id. at 1737. CompareN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (2015) (prohibiting access by sex offenders to
particular websites under criminal law when the platform allows minors), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(2), (g) (prohibiting access by anyone to any website under criminal and tort law
when the platform does not consent to the access).
269. Another reason to subject cyber-trespass law to First Amendment scrutiny might stem from
why it seeks to regulate what it regulates. See Post, supra note 240, at 716 (explaining that "First
Amendment coverage is sometimes triggered by what a legal rule regulates, and sometimes it
is triggered by why a legal rule seeks to regulate"); see also Robert Post, RecuperatingFirst
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1255-60 (1995) (exploring how laws enacted to
serve improper interests are rendered unconstitutional under First Amendment doctrine);
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that First Amendment
doctrine "has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental
motives"). Jane Bambauer has argued that regulating access to information "rouses the First
Amendment" when the state regulates access to that information "precisely because it informs
people." Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REv. 57, 61 (2014) [hereinafter
Bambauer, Is Data Speech?]. Although generally applicable laws may regulate the ability to
obtain information without triggering First Amendment concerns, Bambauer argues that
constitutional coverage should extend to laws that "target[] information-gathering for the very
purpose of disrupting it." Bambauer, Empirical,supra note 231, at 955 (citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972)). For Bambauer, the appropriate coverage question isn't
whether data on computers is "speech" in a colloquial or abstract sense, but rather whether the
state is regulating the ability to access information in a way that "deliberately interferes with an
individual's effort to learn something new." Bambauer, Is DataSpeech?, supra, at 60. If that's
the state's motive, the regulation must withstand judicial scrutiny under First Amendment
doctrine. Id. at 60-61. Cyber-trespass law clearly warrants coverage under Bambauer's
proposed standard. The explicit goal ofcyber-trespass law is to restrict people's abilityto obtain
information that's accessible through computers. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2); EF Cultural
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At least one court has suggested that tort claims brought under cybertrespass law are immune from First Amendment review because state action is
lacking." The gist of that court's reasoning was that cyber-trespass law merely
enforces the desires of private actors, not state actors.271 Yet the same court
recognized that a criminal cyber-trespass prosecution "would undoubtedly
constitute state action" despite the fact that such a prosecution would also enforce
a private actor's desire to forbid access to awebsite.272 This discrepancy reveals why
the court's proposed distinction between criminal and tort liability is irrelevant to
the state-action question in cyber-trespass law, just as this distinction doesn't alter
the constitutional calculus in real-world trespass law. Instead, the answer to the
state-action question turns on whether cyber-trespass law is a "contextually
inappropriate" use of state power, regardless of whether it involves a lawsuit
There's no easy rule to "explain
brought by, or at the behest of, private actors.
what counts as contextually inappropriate, or which actors are barred from using
which rules for which ends in which settings," but the determination ultimately
rests on judgments about a law's relationship with the social structures that it
seeks to regulate.2 74 In the case of cyber-trespass law, the First Amendment
comes into play because the law regulates access to information through a

270.

271.

272.
273.

Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that the CFAA "is
primarily a statute imposing limits on access and enhancing control by information
providers"); Bambauer,Empirical, supranote 231, at 956 (arguing that cyber-trespass laws like
the CFAA "directly and purposefully restrict access to information"). There might be
persuasive reasons to restrict access to information, but those reasons speak to whether and
when cyber-trespass law should survive constitutional scrutiny as opposed to the threshold
question of constitutional coverage. See id. at 957 (noting several "concrete and important
state interests" that can be served by laws regulating access to information on computers,
including "prevent[ing] espionage, denial-of-service attacks, and downstream identity
theft").
Eg., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1114 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(observing that "the threshold issue of state action presents a serious hurdle to any direct First
Amendment claim against LinkedIn").
See id. ("LinkedIn is not a state official or governmental agency; it is a private party and there is
no evidence that the CFAA has served to compel or encourage LinkedIn to withdraw hiQ's
authorization to access its website."). The federal government made a similar argument in
another cyber-trespass case, although it suggested that this factor meant there was no state
action in criminal actions as well. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1,11 (D.D.C. 2018)
(rejecting the government's argument that there could be no First Amendment violation
because the case was about "a private actor's abridgment of free expression in a privateforum").
hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 n.12.
See Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45
(2006) (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY

(1983)) (outlining the existence of a principle under the First Amendment that "prevents
private actors from enlisting law in contextually inappropriateways").
274.

See id. (citing ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT (1995)).

1230

68 UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2022)

medium of communication, even though liability ultimately stems from a
private actor's lack of consent. 25 When private actors bring cyber-trespass
claims to enforce their desires, state action exists because the government is
responsible for distributing private rights to exclude people from websites by force
of law. 276
Although the metaphor of cyberspace as a "place" can be illuminating in
some circumstances, 277 it's unwise to assume total equivalence between laws that
regulate access to cyberspaces and laws that regulate access to real-world spaces. 278
Orin Kerr has warned that "reliance on the virtual metaphor of cyberspace carries
considerable dangers" because "virtual metaphors of cyberspace are likely to rely
on assumptions drawn from the physical world that do not apply to the
Internet." 2 79 "At its worst," Kerr argues, "the virtual metaphor blinds us to how the
Internet works" because "it substitutes metaphors from physical space instead of
the reality of the Internet's dynamics." 20 These dynamics are crucial in the
context of constitutional coverage. Cyberspace is imbued with expressive
activity because the internet's very essence is to enable communication and
information exchanges. The same cannot be said, of course, for tracts of land. As
the next Subpart demonstrates, the status of websites as First Amendment media
doesn't mean that comparing cyberspace to the real world is always foolish, nor
does it mean that principles of trespass law have no place on the internet. But it
does mean that the premise of the blackacre principle-that websites should be
treated just like parcels of private land-shouldn't impede First Amendment
coverage in constitutional challenges to cyber-trespass law.
B.

Constitutional Protection: Public and Private Cyberspaces

Cyber-trespass laws should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny because
they regulate access to websites, which are critical media of communication in

&

275. See Grimmelmann, supra note 65, at 1501-02.
276. Nathan S. Chapman, The EstablishmentClause, State Action, and Town of Greece, 24 WM.
MARY BILL RTs. J. 405, 409 (2015) (proposing the "distribution principle" of state-action
doctrine whereby "the government is responsible for distributing rights, not for the actions of
private parties").
277. See infra Subpart I.B.
278. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 11-12 (2006) (noting "important differences"
between social interactions "in real space" and interactions through "a virtual medium" in
cyberspace); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210,210-26 (2007)
(critiquing adherents of the "cyberspace" as "space" metaphor and describing the metaphor as
"hotly contested").
279. Orin S. Kerr, Virtual Crime, VirtualDeterrence:A Skeptical View ofSelf-Help, Architecture, and
Civil Liability, 1 J.L. ECON.& POL'Y 197, 199, 214 (2005).
280. Id. at 214.
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modern society. But the fact that there's First Amendment coverage in this area
only begins the inquiry. The Supreme Court has explained that "[e] ach medium
of expression... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards
suited to it, for each may present its own problems."81 This doctrine reflects the
realitythat media scholars like Ronald Deibert have long recognized: "[T]he media
through which we communicate are not 'neutral' or 'empty' vessels, but present
specific constraints and opportunities for the nature and type of communications
that can take place through them." 8 2
Identifying the appropriate First
Amendment analysis when examining regulations of the internet requires careful
attention to the internet's nature as a medium.
At the most general level, websites serve as media for communication
because they allow people to "gain access to information and communicate with
one another about it."283 Sound First Amendment analysis focuses on the
communicative practices surrounding information exchanges rather than on the
nature of information in any inherent sense. 28 4 This emphasis is particularly
important when conversations turn-as they often do in the digital age-to the
complicated relationship between free speech and privacy. Although we might
colloquially ask whether a particular piece of information is public or private, as if
these labels can be neatly ascribed to information by simply looking at the
information itself,28 ' it's unhelpful to talk about information in these abstract terms.
Rather, we should consider how, where, why, and with whom we share
information.28 6 We should focus, in other words, on the social structure of
particularcommunicative practices.28 7

281. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
282. Ronald J. Deibert, Black Code: Censorship, Surveillance, and the Militarisationof Cyberspace, 32
MILLENNIUM 501, 503 (2003); see also RONALD J. DEIBERT, PARCHMENT, PRINTING, AND
HYPERMEDIA: COMMUNICATION IN WORLD ORDER TRANSFORMATION (1997).

283. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
284. See Bambauer, Is DataSpeech?, supranote 269, at 58-60.
285. See RICHARDS, supra note 154, at 166 (observing that information rarely exists "at the extremes
of 'public' and 'private"' and instead occupies "intermediate states of privateness and
publicness").
286. See id. at 145-46, 166 (focusing on the particular communicative practices that result in
information exchanges).
287. See, e.g., ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION
AGE (2018) (arguing that we should understand information privacy in terms of relationships
of trust); Post, supra note 88, at 1800-09 (discussing how social practices should define First
Amendment prerogatives when speech occurs on government property); Eugene
Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and
"Cyberstalking", 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 731 (2013) (exploring the different First
Amendment treatment of laws that regulate speech targeted at particular individuals
and speech directed to the general public); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014)
(discussing different First Amendment rules that apply in different forums).
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First Amendment law often infers the social structure of communicative
practices from the places in which speech occurs. The constitutional significance
of the public square, for example, stems from the fact that communities historically
used this location to speak openly among friends and strangers alike. The same is
true for parks and streets-both of which also enjoy special status in First
Amendment doctrine as "traditionalpublic fora." 88 These locations enjoy this
special status because each forum "embraces the social norm that assumes the
openness and accessibility of that forum to all comers.""'
Some have argued that the internet is the "equivalent of the public square" in
today's world.29 0 This analogy is tempting given the internet's open architecture,
which permits anyone with a computer to publish information that can be accessed
by anyone else with a computer.291 As Orin Kerr explains:
This process is open to all. The computer doesn't care who drops by.
By default, all visitors get service.... A visitor might be any one of the
billion or so Internet users around the world.... The open nature of the
Web is no accident; it is a fundamental part of the Web's technological
design.292

Kerr has argued that this means that "websites are the cyber-equivalent of an open
public square in the physical world."2 93
Yet this vision of the internet as the public square is complicated by several
factors. The first is that the vast majority of websites are created and managed by
private actors, not public authorities. On that level, at least, Clay Shirky is correct
when he says that the internet "is not a public sphere," but rather "a private sphere
that tolerates public speech."2 94 The second complication is that, while the internet

288.
289.
290.

See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 476; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989);
Post, supra note 88.
See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
See RONALD

J.

DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE DARK SIDE OF THE

INTERNET 106 (2013) (making this claim in reference to platforms like Facebook and Twitter).
291. Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1162.
292. Id.; see also Deibert, supra note 282, at 504 (asserting that the internet is "[l]ibertarianby nature,
open in its architecture").
293. Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1163. Although Kerr makes this claim in seemingly general
terms, he clearly doesn't believe that all websites would fit this analogy. See id. at 1163-64
(arguing that websites with authentication requirements should be treated differently under
cyber-trespass law).
294. ERICA NEWLAND, CAROLINE NOLAN, CYNTHIA WONG & JILLIAN YORK, BERKMAN CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC'Y & CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ACCOUNT DEACTIVATION AND
CONTENT REMOVAL: GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR COMPANIES AND USERS 5

(2011),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu/files/FinalReport onAccountDeac
tivation_and_Content_Removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/47T6-HNUD]
(quoting Clay

Shirky).
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may have initially been "biased towards openness," pressures from commercial
interests to regulate and control the internet "are beginning to alter its basic
material architecture in ways that may undermine" its ability to serve as "an open
global communications environment."2 95 Website owners often erect barriers to
universal entry that challenge the equivalence of the internet to the traditional
public square. Relatedly, laws can disrupt the internet's presumption toward
openness by-as we've seen-recognizing rights to exclude specific people from
websites that are otherwise accessible to the general public.2 9
These complications are all important. They show that various legal, social,
and economic factors should give us pause before concluding that the internet is
the modern equivalent of the public square. But there's a deeper problem with the
analogy-a problem that also plagues the analogy drawn in cyber-trespass law
between websites and blackacres. Put simply, both analogies treat the internet as a
monolith when it's anything but. There are over one billion websites online.2 97 No
surprise, then, that cyberspace is a diverse place. As Danielle Citron has noted:
"[P]ublic conversation is not the only thing happening online. Online platforms
host a dizzying array of activities. Some sites are hybrid workplaces, schools, social
clubs, and town squares.
Some are password-protected; others are
not.... Networked spaces serve as crucial speech platforms, but they are not
one-dimensional speech platforms."2 98
Some courts have been wise to this reality. In assessing the appropriate reach
of cyber-trespass law on the internet, one judge explained that "it would be illadvised to 'equate the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks"'
because doing so "would 'gloss over the dual public and private nature of digital
arenas"' and mistakenly treat the internet's "most secluded nooks and crannies"
identically to publicly accessible websites. 299 Indeed, the "loose rhetoric" in

295. Deibert, supra note 282, at 501.
296. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003) (seeming to doubt
"thatthere is a 'presumption' of open access to Internet information" because "[t]he CFAA,
after all, is primarily a statute imposing limits on access and enhancing control by information
providers").
297. Adrienne LaFrance, How Many Websites Are There?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/how-many-websites-arethere/408151 [https://perma.cc/UPW6-HWWN]; Sean Fleming, This Is How Many
Websites
Exist
Globally,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Sept.
2,
2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/chart-of-the-day-how-many-websitesare-there/ [https://perma.cc/JA7U-ZZ26].
298. CITRON, supra note 63, at 191-92.
299. Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2018) (alterations omitted) (first quoting
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring); then
quoting Note, FirstAmendment-Freedom of Speech-Public Forum Doctrine-Packingham
v. North Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REv. 233,238 (2017)).
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Packingham that arguably committed this sin caused several justices to concur
only in the Court's judgment and not its opinion."
This brings us to my fundamental argument. Cyber-trespass law shouldn't
treat all websites as private blackacres-as insulated cyberspaces over which
website owners may exercise limitless discretion to prevent people from gathering
information for any reason whatsoever. Nor should cyber-trespass law treat all
websites as public squares-as open cyberspaces that are immune from the types
of privacy protections served by trespass laws. Instead, cyber-trespass law should
recognize two different types of cyberspaces, distinguishing between websites that
are accessible to the general public (what I'll now call public websites or the public
internet) and websites that are inaccessible to the general public (what I'll now call
private websites or the private internet). 301 The First Amendment should limit the
application of the blackacre principle on the public internet but not on the private
internet. This distinction serves privacy and speech interests while enabling digital
research and oversight in a way that the First Amendment demands.
Public websites are an integral part of the modern public sphere. For First
Amendment purposes, the public sphere is a sociological construct that describes
"the arena in which members of the general public meet" and engage in "public
discussion and exchange."" 2 Once information has become accessible to the
general public and has thereby entered the public sphere, the First Amendment
largely bars the government from restricting the later use of that information. 30 3
In Nebraska PressAssociation v. Stuart,"4 for example, the Supreme Court
assessed whether a criminal defendant could protect his right to fair trial by
preventing public discussion of his alleged confession. 305 Even though his fair-trial

300. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1743-44 (Alito, J., concurring).
301. These monikers are only for ease of reference. They don't mean, of course, that we'd
colloquially call all information contained on public websites "public" or on private websites
"private." Someone could share intimate details about another person's sex life on a public
website without that person's consent, for example. Or two people could discuss a widely
publicized news story through an encrypted online messaging service. The labels merely serve
as shorthand for the way we should think about the communicative practices that occur on
different websites. For First Amendment purposes, there's a difference between regulating
access to information that's shared with the general public and information that isn't.
302. Post, supra note 88, at 1717, 1788.
303. Cf Eugene Volokh, No Take-Backs, No Do-Overs, No Data Replevin, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(June 13,2019,5:27 PM), https://reason.com/2019/06/13/no-take-backs-no-do-overs-no-datareplevin [https://perma.cc/VC7L-Z344] (commenting on a case in which the court evaded a
lawsuit's "profound First Amendment implications" by holding that the plaintiff couldn't rely
on the remedy ofreplevin to "take back" what he already said in a digital recording).
304. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
305. Id. at 541.
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right was itself of a "constitutional magnitude,"306 the Court overturned the trial
court's decision to enjoin all discussion of the confession before his trial.307 In so
doing, the Court explained that the information had already been discussed at a
preliminary hearing that was open to the general public and that, under the First
Amendment, "a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject
intimately affecting life within it."308 Once the information had entered the public
sphere, the trial judge's attempt to claw it back became unconstitutional. 309
Similar themes appeared in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn310 and Florida
Star v. B.J.F.,31 two cases in which news outlets were initially found liable after
publishing crime victims' names.312 The television station in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. aired a rape-murder victim's name that had already been "publicly revealed"
in court records, 313 while the newspaper in FloridaStarprinted a rape victim's name
that its reporter obtained from a "publicly released police report" made available in
a police department's pressroom. 314 In both cases, the Court held that that the First
Amendment protected the use of information that, by virtue of already being
released to the general public, had entered the "the public domain." 315

306.
307.
308.
309.

310.
311.
312.

313.
314.
315.

RICHARDS, supranote 154, at 62.
Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 567-70.
Id. at 567.
Two years later, in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court, the Court
again considered the state's ability to prohibit information flows through injunctions. After an
eleven-year-old boy was charged with murder, reporters learned the child's name during his
detention hearing and took his photograph as he left the courthouse. 430 U.S. 308, 308-09
(1977) (per curiam). Newspapers, radio stations, and television stations then publicized his
name and photograph, but a state court enjoined the media from publishing his name or
photograph again. Id. The Court held that the injunction violated the First Amendment by
barring further publication of "widely disseminated information" that was initially obtained
during proceedings that were "open to the public." Id. at 310;see alsoSmith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97,103 (1979) (describing OklahomaPublishingas holding that "once the truthful
information was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain[,]' the court could not
constitutionally restrain its dissemination"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,362-63 (1966)
("[T]here is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom."); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What
transpires in the court room is public property.... Those who see and hear what transpired
can report it with impunity.").
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 471, 474 (assessing the constitutionality of imposing civil liability
under a state law recognizing tortious invasion of privacy); Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526 (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987)) (assessing the constitutionality of imposing civil liability under a
state law making it illegal to "print, publish, or broadcast" the names of victims of sexual
offenses).
Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 471, 473-74.
Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526-27.
Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495-96 (determining that the information was in "the public
domain" because it had already been "released to the public" in records that were "open to
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The Court addressed a different species of legal rule in Smith v. Daily Mail
PublishingCo., 316 an especially important precedent for our purposes because the
case involved information gathered from nongovernmental sources. When a
teenage boy killed his classmate, reporters from two newspapers learned his name
from people who were present at the scene.31 ' After several radio stations then
aired the boy's name, the newspapers also printed it and were indicted under a state
law making it a crime to publish the names ofchildren charged as juveniles without
a court's written approval.318 The Court held that the First Amendment barred the
state from punishing publication of this information.3 19 Though the Court
recognized that its prior cases involved situations in which the government itself
made the information accessible, it brushed off this distinction, explaining that the
public "cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to
supply it with information."3 2 What mattered wasn't the source of the
information but the fact that the information was already in the public
domain.321

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

public inspection"); Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 527, 532, 538 (explaining that the information was in
"the public domain" because the department didn't "restrict access either to the pressroom or
to the reports made available therein"). To serve privacy interests that might be jeopardized by
open judicial proceedings, the Court in Cox BroadcastingCorp. explained that states must take
steps to "avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information" in the first
place, rather than restricting the flow of information already in the public domain. Cox Broad.
Corp., 420 U.S. at 495-96. The Court in FloridaStarespoused a similar no-clawback principle,
explaining that states could constitutionally seclude information on the front end instead of
unconstitutionally outlawing use of that information on the back end. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at
538.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Id. at 99 (noting that the reporters initially discovered the boy's name after speaking not only
to police officers and a prosecutor, but also to witnesses).
Id. at 98-100.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 103-04.
Another case that tangentially bolsters this line of precedent is New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), in which a RAND Corporation employee leaked a
top-secret Pentagon study known as the Pentagon Papers to the press. Niraj Chokshi,
Behind the Race to Publish the Top-Secret Pentagon Papers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/pentagon-papers-post.html
[https://perma.cc/8QYE-YBLJ].
Although the Pentagon study was a government
document, it's hard to frame this as a case where the government released the information to
the general public because it was leaked selectively by someone who wasn't a government
official. Id. Nor does it seem fair to say that the information was already in the public domain
when the Supreme Court heard the case, both because the classified report was initially shared
with only a handful of newspapers and because the government fought tooth and nail to prevent
it from being published. Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the newspapers had a
First Amendment right to publish the study. Id.; see also Landmark Commc'ns v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 831-32, 837, 845-46 (1978) (striking down a newspaper's criminal conviction
for publishing lawfully obtained information about a confidential government hearing).
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In recent years, courts have applied principles embedded in these cases to
recognize a First Amendment "right to record" in public using digital technologies
like smartphones. 322 Under these cases, citizens have successfullyinvoked the First
Amendment to protect their ability to use digital technology to gather information
in areas that are accessible to the general public. These cases lend further support
to the notion that a constitutional shift occurs once information becomes publicly
accessible-a notion that others have already argued should apply when
information is gathered from public websites.32 3 Even scholars skeptical of the
right to record recognize that First Amendment values are served by protecting the
ability to collect information in public places."'
Taken together, these cases illustrate First Amendment protections for
gathering and using information that has already entered the public sphere.
Once information had been "publicly revealed"" 5 and "widely
disseminated"3 2 6 to the general public, it became unconstitutional to "restrain
its dissemination"" 7 and retract it from the "public domain."3 28 The same
principles should apply when information is disseminated through public
websites, which form an integral part of the modern public sphere. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly affirmed the First Amendment's role "not only... in
fostering individual self-expression," but also "in affording the public access to

322. See Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REv. 167 (2017); Seth F.
Kreimer, PervasiveImageCaptureand theFirstAmendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right
to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 335 (2011); Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid
Being Mapped): Reconceiving First Amendment Protectionfor Information-Gatheringin the
Age of Google Earth, 14 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 115 (2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78,
83 (1st Cir. 2011); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,
622 F.3d 248,262 (3d Cir. 2010); Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353,359 (3d Cir. 2017);
Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688-89 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d
583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1203 (9th Cir.
2018); W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1195-97 (10th Cir. 2017); Smith v.
City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d
65, 75 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating that "[t]here are strong First Amendment interests" in
photographically recording one's own voting ballot because the "use of illustrations or
pictures... serves important communicative functions") (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of
Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626,647 (1985)).
323. See Bambauer, Empirical, supra note 231, at 958 (suggesting that researchers' interests in
scraping information from publicly accessible websites could rely on these "right to record"
cases).
324. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recordingas Heckling, 108 GEo. L.J. 125, 132-47 (2019).
325. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,471 (1975).
326. Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308,310 (1977) (per curiam).
327. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
328. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,538 (1989).
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discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas."32 9 Platforms
shouldn't be able to publish information to the world and then prohibit people
from accessing it merely by expressing that desire-a power that Kerr aptly
compares to "publishing a newspaper but then forbidding someone to read it."33
Yet this is precisely the power that platforms enjoy under cyber-trespass law.
In sum, when assessing the constitutionality of regulations that restrict
information flows, First Amendment doctrine is contextual. Constitutional
analysis has focused on the particular communicative practices surrounding
information exchanges rather than emphasizing the nature of the information
itself. The doctrine's contextual sensitivity explains why, despite repeated requests
from media defendants, the Court has refused to resolve constitutional cases under
a blanket rule that always immunizes the publication of truthful information no
matter how it's obtained." It also reveals why courts have emphasized that "[t]he
right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrainedright to gather
information." 2 In Houchinsv. KQED, Inc.,"' for instance, the Court rejected the
"notion that the First Amendment confers a right of access to news sources,"
holding that journalists enjoyed no special privilege to speak to inmates in a jail
simply because they sought to write stories about incarceration. 4 Crucially, the
Court noted that "[t]he right to receive ideas and information is not the issue
in this case" because the journalists "claimed special privilege of access" to an
area that was inaccessible to the general public.3" Although the Court

329.

330.
331.
332.

333.
334.
335.

First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753,762 (1972) (noting the "variety of contexts [in which] this Court has referred to a First
Amendment right 'to receive information and ideas"'); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (explaining that the right to receive
information "is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution"); cf Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010)
(observing that "[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different points
in the speech process"); FirstNat'l Bank of Bos., 435 U.S. at 783 ("[T]he First Amendment goes
beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government
from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.").
Kerr, Norms, supranote 45, at 1169.
See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491 (1975); Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 531-32.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,16-17 (1965) (emphasis added) (finding no First Amendment issue
with the government's refusal to issue the plaintiff a passport to visit Cuba despite plaintiffs
claim that this action interfered with his ability to acquaint himself with the effects of the
government's policies toward Cuba);see alsoSandvigv. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1,17 (D.D.C.
2018) (accepting the government's argument that "the First Amendment does not create a
right to acquire information in whatever manner one desires" in a case about cyber-trespass
law).
438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 11, 16.
Id. at 12; accordBranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,684-85 (1972) (explaining that "[n]ewsmen
have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public
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stressed that "[t]here is an undoubted right to gather news 'from any source
by means within the law,"' it clarified that the First Amendment doesn't
supply
or governments-to
"compel[]
others-private persons
information."336

"

This brings us to the companion of the right to gather information from the
public sphere: the right to seclude information from the public sphere. I call these
rights "companions" because they serve complementary FirstAmendment values.
We can think of the right to seclude information from the public sphere as a
privacy right, but it's better to think of it here as a species of a speech right-or, to
borrow Neil Richards's term, as a First Amendment right to "intellectual
privacy."" Not only can this right be harmonized with First Amendment
protection for free speech, but it's an essential component of that
constitutional protection because the ability to seclude speech "plays a critical
role in the freedom of thought and any speech flowing from that thought."338
As Richards explains, "new ideas often develop best away from the intense
scrutiny of public exposure" and "a meaningful guarantee of privacyprotection from surveillance or interference-is necessary to promote this
kind of intellectual freedom." 339 Seclusion, as Scott Skinner-Thompson has
argued, operates as an "incubator"for both ideas and future speech.3
Seclusion's First Amendment pedigree can be seen in decisions protecting
certain zones of privacyin the service of free thought and association.341 In Stanley

336.
337.

338.

339.
340.
341

is excluded"); Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 17-18 (distinguishingZemel and Houchins in a cybertrespass case involving researchers scraping public websites because the researchers "are not
asking the Court to force private websites to provide them with information that others cannot
get" and "seek only to prevent the government from prosecuting them for obtaining or using
information that the general public can access").
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11.
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEXAS L. REv. 387, 408-25 (2008); see also Paul M.
Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh's First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1559, 1563-64, 1572 (2000) (arguing that seclusion of
information serves First Amendment values because some degree of privacy is necessary for
thoughts and ideas to breed); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent
Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an
Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REv. 799,802 (2006).
Skinner-Thompson, supra note 324, at 147; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 63 (1991) (arguing thatthe First Amendment "imposes a need for 'breathingspace')
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)); Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, supra note 269,
at 111 ("Seclusion provides respite from observation and judgment. Seclusion serves a variety
of social goals: It allows us to engage in productive secrets. Seclusion is where a person can
practice and fail in peace.").
Neil M. Richards, The Dangersof Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1934, 1946 (2013).
Skinner-Thompson, supranote 324, at 125.
See id. at 147-53.
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v. Georgia,"' the Court invoked the First Amendment to invalidate a law
criminalizing the possession of pornography, declaring that "[o]ur whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds."" The government, said the Court, "has no business telling
a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch."" Similar constitutional concerns animated the Court's decision
in Lamont v. PostmasterGeneral,"' which concerned a federal law requiring
recipients of mail deemed to be "communist political propaganda" to first
notify the government of their desire to receive the mail before it would be
delivered.346 The Court struck down the law, concluding that the invasive
regime was "at war" with the First Amendment's pledge to ensure
"'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and discussion.""
These
decisions, among others, speak to how intrusions into private spaces and
relationships can raise First Amendment concerns. 348 Or, put differently, they
show how laws protecting "reasonably understood zones of seclusion" can
withstand even a broad understanding of the First Amendment right to free
expression.349

342. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
343. Id. at 565; cf W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,559 (1985) (emphasizing that the First Amendment protects both
a right to speak and a right not to speak); Wooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,714 (1977) (same).
344. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
345. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
346. Id. at 302 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4008(a)).
347. Id. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964)).
348. See Kreimer, supra note 338, at 68 ("The Court has regularly recognized that shelter from
public exposure is often a prerequisite to the contribution of unorthodox views to the
marketplaces of ideas."); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 495 (Cal. 1998)
(concluding that laws protecting seclusion "serve the undisputedly substantial public interest
in allowing each person to maintain an area of physical and sensory privacy in which to live").
The Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Patterson,357 U.S. 449 (1958), rests on analogous
principles, although it wasn't decided on First Amendment grounds. Alabama invoked a state
law to compel the NAACP to disclose the names and addresses of its members, but the Court
blocked the disclosure because it would have "the practical effect 'of discouraging' the exercise
of constitutionally protected political rights." Id. at 461 (quoting Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950)). The Court "recognized the vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations" and invalidated the production order
as a violation of due process. Id. at 462; see also Thomas E. Kadri, The Tools of PoliticalDissent:
A FirstAmendment Guide to Gun Registries, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 124, 129
(2014) (discussing the contemporary constitutional significance of NAACP v. Patterson).
349. RICHARDS, supra note 154, at 68 (arguing that laws prohibiting eavesdropping, wiretapping,
video voyeurism, and harassment by paparazzi can all be consistent with the First Amendment
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As with the right to gather information, the right to seclude information
requires protection in cyberspace. As Richards has insisted, "We need places and
spaces (real and virtual) in which to read, to think, to explore.""' While the
internet's open architecture is integral to its social value, so is the "legal and
technical framework" that allows people "to establish a zone of privacy and
security, free from the intervention of others."" The value of online seclusion
only increases as technology progressively enables "[s]ubtler and more farreaching means of invading privacy.""' Whereas prior generations worried more
about how new technologies could lead to the "invasion of 'the sanctities of a man's
home and the privacies of life,"' 35 3 we must now guard against intrusions into the
sanctities of our cyberspaces as well. Cyber-trespass law is-and should remaina potent protection for online seclusion on the internet. When platforms create
closed spaces that are inaccessible to the general public, the blackacre principle
should apply; that is, platforms-or, in many cases, people who have accounts on
the platforms' websites-should be able to rely on cyber-trespass law to exclude
others from those private spaces and seek damages for intrusions. Invasions of
private cyberspaces disrupt the confidentiality upon which the freedom of
thought rests, thereby harming both privacy and speech interests.354 The law
should provide redress for these harms.355

350.
351.
352.

353.
354.

355.

on the basis that they protect reasonably understood zones of seclusion); see also Fla. Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,534 (1989) ("To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the
government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition....").
RICHARDS, supranote 154, at 97.
Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1650.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Paul
M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REv. 815 (2000) (arguing that the
collection and use of personal data tied to internet activity poses grave new threats to privacy
and democracy).
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616,630 (1886)).
See Richards, supranote 337, at 403-07 (arguing that intellectual privacy is an important First
Amendment value); Kerr, Trespass, supra note 8, at 1554-55 (arguing that cyber-trespass
creates "serious privacy harms" by impairing confidentiality of information, while also
harming the "integrity" of concealed information and the ability to rely on it because the victim
"will not know what the hacker did or whether important data has been altered or deleted");
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, CriminalizingRevenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 345, 368 (2014) (discussing a case in which hacking into private cyberspaces fed the
market for nonconsensual distribution of intimate images); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915-17 (2019) (discussing harms to sexual privacy that can stem
from hacking); Bambauer, Is DataSpeech?, supra note 269, at 101 (arguing that if people are
"[s]tripped of all privacy" they "will naturally and rationally engage in the sort of self-restraint
and self-censorship that serve neither themselves nor society at large").
In this way, criminal cyber-trespass law provides an analog to existing protections in tort law
for "intrusion upon seclusion." See RICHARDS, supra note 154, at 67; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 625B (AM. L. INST. 1977) (outlining that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion
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At the same time, we should resist stretching the idea of seclusion too far.
Jane Bambauer has observed that "the need and expectation of seclusion cannot go
far beyond the home, private conversations, and other narrow circumstances," or
else "the diminishing returns of seclusion will have increasingly severe effects
on the liberty of others."356 The contextual boundaries of a First Amendment
right to gather information in the public sphere are mirrored in the contextual
boundaries of a First Amendment protection for information that has been
concealed from the public sphere. Just as the decision to disseminate information
to the general public restricts the government from punishing its subsequent use
by others, so too does the decision to conceal information from the general
public permit the government to provide legal protections to safeguard its
seclusion.
This demarcation can be quite fuzzy in the real world, but courts have
engaged in contextual inquiries to identify when communicative practices fall
within a "zone of solicitude or seclusion" that merits protection against
intrusion.357 Courts generally base their judgments on the particulars of the place
where speech occurs or the relationship between the speaker and audience. 358 The
tort of intrusion upon seclusion, for example, asks whether the circumstances
render the invasion "offensive to an ordinary person" when determining the tort's
compatibility with the First Amendment.359 In Shulman v. Group WProductions,
Inc., 360 for example, the California Supreme Court concluded that reporters had no
First Amendment defense to liability for intrusion upon seclusion when they
recorded a conversation in an ambulance helicopter between an accident victim
and her nurse.361 The social structure ofthe particular communicative practices-

356.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

provides that "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person");
Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (N.H. 1964) (holding that a landlord was liable for
installing a listening device in the bedroom of his married tenants because "[t]he tort of
intrusion upon the plaintiffs solitude or seclusion is not limited to a physical invasion of his
home or his room or his quarters"); see also Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 205,205 (2012) (arguing that "[t]he tort ofintrusion upon seclusion offers
the best theory to target legitimate privacy harms in the information age").
Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, supra note 269, at 112; see also Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting
Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REv. 311 (2013) (arguing that intimacy-both bodily and
spatial-is and should be a core interest protected by privacy law).
See RICHARDS, supra note 154, at 70 (offering examples of wiretapping someone's phone or
recording audio or video in someone's home as representative of this zone of seclusion).
Id. at 70-71 (suggesting that "[n]ude beaches might be different from bedrooms").
See id. at 70.
955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
Id. at 490-92,495-97.
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their spatial and interpersonal features-determined whether legal protections for
seclusion were constitutional.
Constitutional analyses of cyber-trespass law should follow a similar path.
The internet's architecture creates a default that websites are accessible to the
general public," 2 but platforms can take affirmative steps to make their websites
inaccessible to the general public by erecting technological barriers that effectively
prevent access. The principle of authentication provides a sound first step in
demarcating the boundary between the public and private internet. An
authentication requirement, most commonly a password gate, verifies that a
computer user "is the person who has access rights to the information accessed."363
If a website has no authentication requirement (that is, if anyone can access the
website by entering the address into a browser), then it's part of the public internet
and the First Amendment should limit the application of cyber-trespass law.364
This rule would restrict cyber-trespass liability for gathering information from
vast swathes of the internet, including the publicly accessible portions of
prominent websites like product listings on Amazon, job postings on LinkedIn,
and-dare I say it-presidential tweets on Twitter.365
If, on the other hand, a website features an authentication requirement, the
analysis becomes more delicate. When anyone from the general public can create
an account and thereby access the website, that website should still be classified as
part of the public internet. 366 This would include websites that require people to
apply and even pay for an account, so long as anyone who provides basic
identifying information or pays a fee receives access credentials.
Take the New York Times website, which is designed in a way that permits
different types of access depending on whether a person creates an account and

362. See supranotes 291-293 and accompanying text.
363. Kerr, Norms, supranote 45, at 1147.
364. This would include websites with hard-to-guess addresses, like those at issue in United States
v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014). See also Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1164-65
("A hard-to-guess URL is still a URL, and the information posted at that address is still posted
and accessible to the world."). For similar themes in the context of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, see Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), and Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004).
365. To be clear, these platforms do have authentication requirements to access some portions of
their websites. The First Amendment would pose no bar to cyber-trespass liability if someone
hacked into your direct messages on Twitter or your address book on Amazon.
366. See Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope, supra note 38, at 1646 (arguing as a statutory matter that cybertrespass law shouldn't apply on "a website that appears to require a username and password to
access the contents of the site, but that actually grants access for any username and password
combination").
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pays for one of the various subscriptions available to the general public.3 67 The
Times prohibits scraping in its terms of service.368 (Hypocritically, I think, given
that its own reporters have relied on thousands of scraped tweets, retweets, and
followers to support important investigative journalism on how Donald Trump's
"Twitter Presidency" was "reshaping the nature of the presidency and presidential
power."369 ) The written no-scraping prohibition on the Times website might

&

367. Digital Subscriptions, N.Y. TIMES, https://help.nytimes.com/hc/en-us/articles/1150
15852367-Digital-subscriptions [https://perma.cc/93PN-QZQ7] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021)
(detailing different content available to non-subscribers, Basic Digital Access subscribers,
Home Delivery subscribers, Games subscribers, and Cooking subscribers).
368. Terms of Service, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jan. 3, 2019), https://help.nytimes.com/hc/enus/articles/115014893428-Terms-of-service [https://perma.cc/X9RX-JQHV] ("Without NYT's
prior written consent, you shall not... use robots, spiders, scripts, service, software or any manual
or automatic device, tool, or process designed to data mine or scrape the Content, data or
information from the Services....").
369. Michael D. Shear, Maggie Haberman, Nicholas Confessore, Karen Yourish, Larry Buchanan
Keith Collins, How Trump Reshaped the Presidencyin Over 11,000 Tweets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitterpresidency.html [https://perma.cc/A3PP-PCDB]; see also Katie Van Syckle, The Journalists
Who Read All of President Trump's Tweets.
Twice., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 11/02/insider/trump-twitter-data.html
[https://perma.cc/G2TQ-YRMF] (explaining how Times reporters relied on scraped
tweets published at http://trumptwitterarchive.com, as well as data gathered from
Twitter itself, to build the database of presidential Twitter activity underlying this
story);
Getting
All
the
Tweets,
TRUMP
TWITTER
ARCHIVE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106234703/http://trumptwitterarchive.com/howto
/all_tweets.html [https://perma.cc/Q346-EW5Z] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021) (providing
instructions on how to use the "Twitter Scraper"). The Times certainly isn't alone in
relying on information gathered from other websites to do its research; indeed, it's not
even the only newspaper to conduct this form of analysis on President Trump's tweets. See, e.g,
Christopher Ingraham, On Twitter, Trump Accuses Blacks of Racism Three Times as Often as
1:44
PM),
POST
(Aug.
14,
2017,
Whites,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/14/on-twitter-trump-accusesblacks-of-racism-three-times-as-often-as-whites [https://perma.cc/D3NL-A3ZJ] (relying on
information gathered from Twitter to reveal that President Trump accuses African Americans of
racism far more often than white people when he tweets); Abby Ohlheiser, A Look at the 170
Times Donald Trump Has Tweeted About the 'Losers', WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/09/22/a-look-atthe-170-times-donald-trump-has-tweeted-about-the-losers
[https://perma.cc/26TYLULF] (exposing, quantitively, President Trump's penchant for calling people "losers" on
Twitter); Robert Gebelhoff, Trump's Tweets Could End Up Being a Scientific Treasure,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
27,
2019,
10:44
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/27/trumps-tweets-could-end-upbeing-scientific-treasure [https://perma.cc/7FGX-H3A4] (discussing a research paper based
on "linguistic analysis of the full corpus of Trump's Twitter activity"-almost 22,000 posts
totaling over 362,000 words-and remarking that the tweets, though "nauseating, chock-full
of trollish behavior and mind-numbing stupidity," might ultimately become "a scientific
treasure"). The Washington Post, it seems, is just as hypocritical as the New York Times in
its attitude toward scraping.
See Terms of Service, WASH. POST (July 1, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/terms-of-service/2011/ 11/18/gIQAldiYiN_story.html
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sustain a cyber-trespass claim against a researcher who, say, gathered information
from its website to analyze language shifts in its reporters' stories or its users'
comments describing President Trump over the course of his single term in
office.370 But under my framework, neither the Times nor the federal government
could threaten the researcher with criminal or tort cyber-trespass liability for
collecting that information, even if the researcher was a paying customer logged
into their account. In other words, to shift a website's constitutional status, the
website must feature "virtual barriers" that actually render it inaccessible to the
general public, not merely "virtual speed bumps" that slow down the public's
ability to collect information from it.371 There might be other legal regimes that
give website owners greater control over subsequent uses of information
that's placed behind paywalls, including contract and copyright law, but
those regimes are subject to their own limitations-including limitations
designed to harmonize them with the First Amendment.372 Cyber-trespass
law shouldn't upset or preempt those regimes.
On the other side of the ledger, websites are part of the private internet
when they're concealed behind technological barriers that render them
inaccessible to the general public. These cyberspaces generally feature
communicative practices that rely on confidentiality and seclusion, such as in
online communities within Facebook groups that grant access to only certain
people. Private websites may also serve as channels or repositories for one-toone (or at least one-to-few) communications, such as direct messaging on
Instagram or email inboxes on Gmail.37 3 There should be no First Amendment
right to invade these cyberspaces, no matter how newsworthy the information that
lies within them might be, just as the First Amendment should provide no defense

[https://perma.cc/Y6ND-L386]
("[W]ithout limitation, you may not:... [e]ngage in
unauthorized 'scraping' or spidering, or harvesting of personal information, or use any
unauthorized automated means to compile information."). Imagine the outcry if these two
stalwart defenders of press freedom forbade readers from analyzing information printed in their
newspapers by including a written prohibition in some centerfold fine-print. I'd hope that the
First Amendment objections would be just as vehement if the Times or the Post then sued a
researcher for trespass to chattels for using a scanner or camera to gather printed information
through technological or automated means. Should the constitutional analysis depend on
whether the information appears in print or on a screen? My view, clearly, is that it shouldn't.
370. See supra Subpart II.A.
371. See Kerr, Norms, supra note 45, at 1161, 1147.
372. See Galbraith, supra note 26, at 357-66; see also hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-CV03301-EMC, 2021 WL 1531172, at *5-10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2021) (assessing claims forbreach
of contract, misappropriation, and trespass to chattels based on website scraping).
373. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1,13 (D.D.C. 2018) (analyzing the constitutional status of
the internet's "most secluded nooks and crannies," such as a person's email inbox).
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for someone who "hold[s] up a postman in order to gather interesting information"
contained in their neighbor's mail. 374
The framework I propose shouldn't trouble those of us concerned (as we all
should be) about the amount of data that platforms collect about us when we use
their websites. The distinction between the public and private internet grants no
special rights to access information that platforms gather about users. For
example, the First Amendment should provide no right to access information that
platforms harvest about a person's keystrokes or the time a person spends on the
website. As I've addressed elsewhere, quite different legal tools are needed to
address the harms caused by the mass accumulation of this kind of information by
powerful (and possibly monopolistic) platforms. 35 If anything, drawing a
distinction between the public and private internet could offer people important
protections against platforms that engage in abusive practices to pilfer their users'
data without permission. Earlier this year, it emerged that Facebook had allegedly
gathered information from its users' email contact books after asking for their
email passwords to "verify" their accounts.3 76 One media report claimed that the
platform obtained data from around 1.5 million users." Although Facebook
claimed that this occurred unintentionally and pledged to delete the data, some
argued that the platform might have violated cyber-trespass law.378 Under the
constitutional distinction I suggest, a password-protected email contact book
would likely qualify as part of the private internet, meaning that Facebook's
incursion was within the bounds of cyber-trespass law and outside the ambit of

374. See Bambauer, Is DataSpeech?,supra note 269, at 79; see also Sandvig, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 13 ("A
hacker cannot legallybreak into a Gmail account and copy the account-holder's emails, just
as a busybody cannot legally reach into someone else's mailbox and open her mail."). In
this respect, I disagree with Victoria Baranetsky's take on the First Amendment's
application to cyber-trespass law because she appears to endorse a constitutional right to
access information on private websites if the information is newsworthy. See D. Victoria
Baranetsky, Data Journalism and the Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/data-journalism-and-the-law.php
[https://perma.cc/9MXQ-BF2D] ("While data may be on private property of various
online sites, First Amendment concerns may outweigh any privacy or other
considerations, especially where there is a public interest in publication of that material.").
375. See Kadri, supra note 1 (discussing legislative reform to prevent platforms using cyber-trespass
law to block complementary and competing services).
376. See Rob Price, Facebook May Have Broken the Law by Harvesting1.5 Million Users'Email
Contacts, Experts Say, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2019, 4:14 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/experts-facebook-law-harvesting- 1-5-users-email-contacts2019-4 [https://perma.cc/MMP7-QEER].
377. Id.
378. Id.
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any First Amendment protection for gathering information from the public
internet.379
Setting the boundaries of potential liability along the lines I propose would
come at a particularly consequential time. In the wake of the "techlash," we're in
the midst of a "constitutional moment" for online privacy. 380 Platforms are
tinkering with their architectures, often in ways that create secluded
communicative forums. 381 Mark Zuckerberg has analogized to real-world spaces
in explaining that Facebook has served as "the digital equivalent of a town square,"
but "people increasingly also want to connect privately in the digital equivalent of
the living room." 8 2 Though we have reasons to doubt his commitment to privacy,
he has expressed his view that platforms should create cyberspaces that allow
people to "speak privately and live freely knowing that their information will only
be seen by who they want to see it."383
Constitutional constraints on cyber-trespass law can acclimate to changes in
networked communications by recognizing distinct rules for public and private
cyberspaces. The relationship between law and technology can, to some degree, be
one of mutual influence. Though constitutional law shouldn't bend merely to
suit technological change, judges interpreting cyber-trespass law's reach
should be attuned to distinctions that platforms create between more public
and private forums. At the same time, constitutional interpretations of cybertrespass law can encourage effective privacy measures by hinging gatekeeper
rights on platforms' willingness to effectively seclude private cyberspaces.
379. Because Facebook appears to have accessed user information that wasn't stored on the
platform's own servers, this incident might represent a rare example of when users could assert
a viable cyber-trespass claim against the platform they're using. As I've explored elsewhere, the
consent-based structure of cyber-trespass law effectively immunizes platforms when they access
information that their users have written or received on the platform's private websites. See
Kadri, supra note 1, at 983-85.
380. See Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy's ConstitutionalMoment and the Limits of
DataProtection,61 B.C. L. REv. 1687,1688, 1691 (2020).
381. See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking, FACEBOOK (Mar. 6,
2019), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-privacy-focused-vision-for-socialnetworking/10156700570096634 [https://perma.cc/7RR4-FLSR].
382. Id.
383. Zuckerberg Outlines Plan for 'Privacy-Focused' Facebook, BBC (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47477677 [https://perma.cc/Q3J8-CVJ7];
see also At Harvard Law, Zittrain and Zuckerberg Discuss Encryption, 'Information
Fiduciaries' and Targeted Advertisements, supra note 224 (making similar comments);
Nick Statt, Facebook Is Redesigning Its Core App Around the Two Parts People Actually
Like
to
Use,
VERGE
(Apr.
30,
2019,
1:30
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/30/18523265/facebook-events-groups-redesignnews-feed-features-f8-2019 [https://perma.cc/4RZC-82DC] (detailing Facebook's plans
to redesign its mobile application to highlight private forums like closed events and
groups instead of its more public-oriented newsfeed).
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Under current doctrine, platforms can claim to be serving privacy interests
through cyber-trespass law by merely forbidding certain activities or sending
cease-and-desist letters. This admonitory approach is insufficient. The law
can create better incentives to build privacy-protective architecture. 384 If
platforms could create digital blackacres only by insulating websites with
sturdy technological defenses, they might make design choices that would
force (or at least allow) users to shield information from the public sphere.

They might, we could say, walk the walk of privacy and not just talk the talk.385
There are, to be sure, legitimate concerns about how people can use
publicly accessible information in harmful ways. These worries were present
in cases like Florida Star and Smith when states targeted injurious uses of
information, 386 but new technologies might alter the magnitude or nature of
certain harms in constitutionally salient ways. I've argued elsewhere that the
First Amendment shouldn't thwart all regulatory attempts to address novel
harms enabled by technology,387 but that doesn't shake my view that cybertrespass law requires constitutional modifications. Indeed, a fatal flaw in
applying the blackacre principle across the entire internet is that it creates a
legal regime that's indifferent to harm.
Consider the example of Clearview AI, a company that gathered over three
billion images from platforms like Facebook and Twitter to develop a facialrecognition technology that it licensed to businesses and police departments
across the United States. 388 This technology, fueled largely by scraping
publicly accessible websites, facilitates an unprecedented level of invasive
and oppressive surveillance by corporations and the government. 389 When

384.

385.
386.
387.
388.

389.

Cf Jack M. Balkin, The Futureof FreeExpression in a DigitalAge, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 427
(2009) (arguing that "the most important decisions affecting the future of freedom of speech
will not occur in constitutional law; they will be decisions about technological design,
legislative and administrative regulations, the formation of new business models, and the
collective activities of end-users"); RICHARDS, supra note 154, at 181 (discussing the idea
"Privacy by Design," which "recognizes that privacy protection in general cannot be ensured
solely by legal rules").
See Kadri, supra note 1, at 985 (arguing that current cyber-trespass doctrine "allows platforms
to talk the talk of protecting privacy without walking the walk").
See supranotes 304-321 and accompanying text.
See Kadri, supranote 245, at 950-58.
Sacharoff, supra note 23, at 586; Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End
Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/JUV8ZDD9].
See Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66
Loy. L. REV. 33 (2020); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital
Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2019); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial
Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018),
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it's effective, facial recognition prevents valuable obscurity in public; when it
fails, it leads to misdirected attention with commercial and criminal
implications.390 Clearview AI provides a compelling example of how privacy harms
can stem from public sources, a point that danah boyd captured memorably when
contrasting the acts of merely gathering information to deploying it in privacyinvasive ways: "It's the difference between recognizing that there are others in the
locker room and staring at them as they get dressed." 391
Courts shouldn't construe the First Amendment to block narrowly tailored
laws that address information-related harms, even when that information is
drawn from publicly accessible sources. Laws regulating the collection and use of
digitized information should survive constitutional scrutiny if they target and
address specific and egregious harms to privacy and autonomy, like those posed
by facial-recognition technology. Cyber-trespass law, however, offers no such
precision. By giving platforms the power to set the internet's informational rules,
delicate questions of public policy become a matter of corporate discretion.
CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed a rethinking of cyber-trespass law based on
sociological and constitutional differences between the public and private internet.
Although there would be edge cases that test this binary distinction, many
websites fall cleanly on either side of the line. The legal distinction would
largely rest on a website's architecture, giving double meaning to Lawrence
Lessig's contention that "code is law" in cyberspace. 392 As Lessig has long
argued, "[t]he software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is
constitute a set of constraints on how you can behave," and while "[t]he
substance of these constraints may vary,... they are experienced as conditions on
your access to cyberspace." 393

https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppressionbc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/8MCS-VCQJ]; Philip E. Agre, Your Face Is Not a Bar
Code: Arguments Against Automatic Face Recognition in Public Places, WHOLE EARTH,
Winter 2001, at 74 (2001).
390. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Why You Can No Longer Get Lost in the Crowd, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/opinion/data-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/G9WA-SM6B].
391. danah boyd, Networked Privacy, Talk at Personal Democracy Forum 2011 (June 6,
2011)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2011/
PDF2011.html [https://perma.cc/CW86-3M7Z]).
392. LESSIG, supra note 278, at 5.
393. Id. at 124.
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Even without the help of cyber-trespass law, code regulates our behavior on
the internet because it "embeds certain values or makes certain values
impossible." 394 Although Lessig drew distinctions between regulation by code
and regulation by law,395 in cyber-trespass law the two regulatory tools should
work in tandem to establish contours of liability that are consistent with
constitutional commands. We'll need much more than changes in cybertrespass law to protect privacy and speech interests in the digital age, but fixing
flaws in the laws we have can create space for the laws we need.

394. Id. at 125; see also Kristen E. Eichensehr,DigitalSwitzerlands,167 U. PA. L. REV. 665,712 (2019)
(asserting that "[t]echnology companies have been regulators for as long as they have written
code").
395.

LESSIG, supra note 278, at 5; see also WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND THE

INFOBAHN 111 (1995) (asserting that computer code is the "law" of cyberspace); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEXAS L. REv. 553, 555 (1998) (coining the term "Lex Informatica" to describe
the technologically imposed rules that govern information flows).

